Peggy Whitson spent 665 days in space on three long-duration ISS missions before a much shorter visit in May commanding the Ax-2 private astronaut mission. (credit: Axiom Space)
A veteran astronaut adjusts to a new era of private spaceflight
by Jeff Foust Monday, June 26, 2023
Peggy Whitson is America’s most experienced astronaut, having spent 665 days in space on three long-duration missions to the International Space Station in 2002, 2008, and 2016–2017. But returning to the station as a private astronaut, commanding Axiom Space’s Ax-2 mission in May, still required some adjustments.
“The short time was the harder part,” she said of the mission, which spent eight days docked to the ISS, during an interview a couple weeks after splashing down in a Crew Dragon spacecraft with her three crewmates May 30.
“The big change really is to go back to short-duration missions, more like a shuttle flight,” she said of training for Ax-2.
“When you go up on a long- duration mission you are thinking, I’ve got time, I can relax now, because I can scale up and start moving later and getting more and more done,” she explained. “But we didn’t have that flexibility. It was very much a focused effort.”
Ax-2 was Axiom’s second in a series of private astronaut missions to the station as the company develops commercial modules to install on the station later this decade, which will later form the core of a standalone commercial station. Ax-1, which went to the station in April 2022, was something of a learning experience for both the company and the agency, particularly in how to schedule all the experiments and outreach activities the crew wanted to achieve.
One of the biggest lessons was optimizing the training for the mission. “The big change really is to go back to short-duration missions, more like a shuttle flight,” she said. “Instead of generic skills training, which is typically how we train a station crew, we were much more task oriented. So, we focused on the tasks we knew we would do and the hardware we knew we’d interface with. That made our crew ready to respond and ready to perform once they got on orbit.”
While Ax-1 got some schedule relief when its ten-day mission was extended a week while waiting for favorable splashdown conditions, Ax-2 had its mission shortened from ten to eight days because of the cascading effects of launch delays and a desire by NASA to keep a cargo Dragon mission on schedule for launch in early June.
“It was a compressed schedule,” she said, but the focus on specific training helped accommodate that time, along with keeping her schedule open in the early days of the mission to assist her crewmates, helped. “I think it was very effective.”
Whitson had been training with John Shoffner, a private astronaut who served as pilot of Ax-2, since 2021, when the two were named as backups for Ax-1. Shoffner used that time to get extra training on ISS systems, including getting a specialist rating—the highest NASA qualification—on station maintenance. “He wanted more of the experience of what it is like to train as a NASA astronaut,” she said, “so we were able to get him that extra training.”
They started training with the other two Ax-2 crew, Saudi astronauts Ali Alqarni and Rayyanah Barnawi, in September. In addition to various training on ISS and Crew Dragon systems, they also did an exercise with the National Outdoor Leadership School, learning what she called “expeditionary skills” in the wilderness, and spent time in the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA), a simulated space habitat at the Johnson Space Center.
Peggy Whitson and Rayyanah Barnawi doing research on the ISS during Ax-2. (credit: Axiom Space)
The training overall went well, Whitson said, and her crewmates adapted well to the station and the research programs. She singled out Barnawi, a cancer researcher, for her dedication to doing experiments in a “glovebox” on the station, spending so much time that others were worried about her.
“I go check on her and I’m like, ‘Everybody’s really worried about you and I want to know how you are feeling about being in here?’ She’s loving it,” she recalled. “I’m basically having to fight her to get her out of there so I could get in there.”
“It was a lot of fun to fly on a new vehicle,” she said. “The Falcon 9 and the Dragon was a sweet ride.”
There are lessons learned and other adjustments to training she wants to incorporate on future Axiom missions to the station. “I want to try and so some more intensive mission-specific training,” she said. The five days the Ax-2 crew spent in HERA was particularly useful, she said, given them experience in a simulated space environment, including learning how to work to a timeline and communicate with controllers.
Visiting the ISS as a private astronaut for the first time, after extended stays as a NASA astronaut, was not as big a change for Whitson as the short mission duration. She compared it to visiting shuttle crews during her earlier long-duration stays there. “It felt familiar in that sense. I was just in the other the other side of it. I was the visiting crew rather than the resident crew.”
The Ax-2 crew got along well with the long-duration station crew. Whitson said they had not gotten a chance to meet with NASA’s Frank Rubio and Roscosmos’ Sergey Prokopyev and Dmitri Petelin before the flight, since the three had been scheduled to return in March before Ax-2. A coolant leak in their Soyuz spacecraft, though, prompted the launch of a replacement that had been intended for the next crew, keeping the three of them on the station until September. “Frank’s an amazing leader and they all have a pretty good attitude about being there an extra six months,” she said.
Whitson, who previously went to the station on shuttle and Soyuz vehicles, enjoying flying Crew Dragon. “It was a lot of fun to fly on a new vehicle,” she said. “The Falcon 9 and the Dragon was a sweet ride.”
A highlight of the Crew Dragon is the touchscreen interface. “It’s very integrated with procedures and data. It feels like you’re very situationally aware as you’re going through the steps and performing actions,” she said. “I find it’s a great interface, much more operator friendly, user friendly for the astronauts.”
Splashing down in the ocean, she added, was also better than the Soyuz landings. “But the shuttle landings on runways is the best way to come home.”
“Now I think we’ve demonstrated that we’ve got this,” she said.
Whitson estimated that Axiom incorporated about 80% of the lessons learned from Ax-1 into Ax-2, with the remaining 20% to be worked into Ax-3, currently scheduled for no earlier than late this year. Axiom has not announced the crew for that mission but, during the webcast of the Ax-2 splashdown, the hosts said that Michael López-Alegría, who commanded Ax-1, would lead Ax-3.
Those training plans will shift again the coming years as Axiom gets its modules installed on the ISS—the first is scheduled for launch as soon as late 2025—and goes towards longer missions. “But I think that to make us successful now we need to really push back toward that short mission and optimize it,” she argued.
“Now I think we’ve demonstrated that we’ve got this,” she said. “The next phase is going to be the continuation and expansion of this.”
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
Taranjit Sandhu (second from right), India’s ambassador to the US, signs the Artemis Accords June 21 as NASA Administrator Bill Nelson looks on. Also participating are Nancy Jackson, deputy assistant secretary of state for India, and Krunal Joshi, ISRO space counsellor. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls)India joins the Artemis Accordsby Ajey Lele Monday, June 26, 2023 Collaboration in space between India and the United States has some six decades of history. It is often mentioned as collaboration between two powers who share values like vibrant democracies and open society. The Indian space program was born in 1963 with the launch of Nike-Apache sounding rockets from the India’s first spaceport, the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station. In the first few years this relationship was thriving, with joint collaborations between NASA and ISRO like the Satellite Instrumental Television Experiment (SITE). Under this program, satellites beamed educational content to television sets for more than 2,000 remote Indian villages.With India becoming a part of this US-led global space regime/governance model, some questions are being raised about India’s space autonomy.But India’s nuclear policies have been the main dampener. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and then a series of nuclear tests in 1998. Subsequently, this relationship has reinvented itself with the success of the US–India civil nuclear deal in 2005. During last week’s visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the US, the space relationship has made more progress. India has now joined the US-led Artemis program. Also, NASA may be sending an Indian astronaut to the Intentional Space Station (ISS) in 2024. The NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) Earth science mission is progressing as planned, with ISRO scheduled to launch this satellite in early 2024.The US was very keen on having India sign the Artemis Accords. On June 21, the Indian ambassador to the US, Taranjit Sandhu, signed on the dotted line. India becomes the 27th state to join this accord. These countries belong with different parts of the world, from Latin America to North America, from Africa to East Asia and the Middle East. India becomes the first South Asian state to join this group.With this, India has acknowledged NASA’s rules in regards to the best practices to be adopted to civilian exploration of space and conduct of activities on the Moon and beyond. This is an interesting shift in India’s space view. From a scientific and technological point of view, the Artemis program involves going to Moon and beyond and there could be various opportunities for India to contribute and learn. India’s space industry is evolving very rapidly and is expected to benefit if India becomes a part of this US-led space architecture.With India becoming a part of this US-led global space regime/governance model, some questions are being raised about India’s space autonomy. At the policy level, has India capitulated its strategy independence in matters related to space governance and security? It appears unlikely that India would surrender. In December 2022, India abstained from voting on a United Nations General Assembly resolution to ban destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) tests, which is a US brainchild. India is an ASAT power and is balancing its strategic needs against a commitment against space weaponization. It is likely to follow an independent path, while contributing on various platforms at the UN level.The Artemis Accords is also about political commitment to principles described within it. It claims to be based on the obligations contained in Outer Space Treaty (OST) and other established structures, like the Liability Convention and Registration Convention. The Accords, announced in October 2020, has 13 sections and many of them match with global views on the use of space for peaceful purposes and transparency.The Artemis Accords signatories include a mix of both established spacefaring nations as well as emerging ones, including some, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with major space ambitions. India is a part of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping, which has two major space players, China and Russia. All this indicates that the Artemis Accords signatories includes counties with differing levels of maturity as well as levels of dependence not only on the US, but also on China and Russia.The elephant in the room is section ten, which is about space resources.India is currently preparing for its first Gaganyaan human spaceflight mission 2025. Indian astronauts have already trained in Russia. The Gaganyaan crew module is designed to carry three astronauts to orbit and splash down after reentry. Section five of the Artemis Accords speaks of interoperability, raising questions of how it might apply to Gaganyaan.Section eight speaks of release of scientific data, but clearly mentions that private sector operations are excluded from data sharing. Going by the present trend, mostly the private players from the US are likely to contribute much towards future planetary missions. Hence, it would be naive to expect much in regards to data accessibility.The elephant in the room is section ten, which is about space resources. Currently, states and private players do not possess the required level of technical expertise to get significant amounts of rock samples from objects in space back to Earth, but the practice of sample return to Earth on smaller scales is already happening. We have no globally accepted polices in this regard. Today, there is a need to have a debate for forming globally accepted structures with respect to management of space resources. It is important to consider section ten and section eleven together, which speaks of creation of “safety zones” on the Moon and other bodies to avoid harmful interference by other agencies operating on those planets. Can a state or a private agency just annex regions and preserve them for future settlement? Such measures should not be implemented unilaterally. It needs a wider debate and acceptance.Space resource mining is predicted to emerge as a thorny issue in the future. There are differing predictions about the prospects for space resources. According to some, a big cargo aircraft load of helium-3 mined from the Moon’s surface could cater for the global energy needs for around ten years, provided there are fusion reactors that can use it. Recent experiments suggest that space-based solar power could become feasible, creating another source of demand for space resources.Interestingly, some countries have established laws that give companies rights to resources they extract from the Moon, asteroids, or other bodies. There is a need to ponder future geopolitical consequences when making any national laws in this regard. The Artemis Accords may be undermining the concept of Common Heritage to Mankind (CHM), or global commons, in space.This is an opportune time to start negotiating for an UN treaty mechanism on space mining. India, now being an insider, needs to engage the US in this regard. There are some dichotomies about the positions of Artemis signatory states. Australia is a signatory to the Moon Agreement, which views Moon and its resources as CHM.It will also be interesting to watch the progress in regards to NASA-ISRO undertaking a mission to take an Indian to ISS in 2024.Broadly, Artemis is about science, commercialization, and norms-making for Moon and beyond. It creates an impression that if you are with us (the US), then you get access to the resources of the Moon and Mars quickly.It is known that NASA astronaut candidates undergo a training and evaluation period lasting approximately 18 to 24 months. Even space tourists are required to spend around six months for training. So the issue is that, how by 2024 NASA can train an Indian astronaut and send him/her to ISS? Can NASA pick up from Indian astronauts, who are already trained in Russia and fast-track the training for their mission? If that is the case, then what would happen to India’s Gaganyaan program?The following are the likely missions to the ISS during 2023 and 2024. It may be noted that already trained astronauts have been identified for all these missions.Boeing (Starliner) Crew Flight Test, was to happen around July 2023. Now stands indefinitely delayed as announced by Boeing on first of June. There would be two astronauts onboard, which includes a very experienced Indian-origin astronaut, Sunita Williams.SpaceX’s Crew-7 mission (August 2023) and Crew-8 mission (2024) could also be carrying Russian cosmonauts. SpaceX is expected to fly a crewed mission to the ISS for Axiom Space and in addition the privately funded Polaris Dawn citizen astronaut flight to orbit by end of 2023.There would Soyuz MS-24 (September 2023), Soyuz MS-25 (March 2024) and Soyuz MS-26 (September 2024) missions happening. There is a possibility of Boeing Starliner-1 mission happening in 2024, but all would depend on when the Crew Flight Test mission gets spaceborne.Broadly, Artemis is about science, commercialization, and norms-making for Moon and beyond. It creates an impression that if you are with us (the US), then you get access to the resources of the Moon and Mars quickly. India should not get overwhelmed by the enormity of this project. India has its own Moon and Mars program, which it should pursue aggressively and at the same time get maximum benefits, in terms of science, technology, and commercial aspects, from the Artemis program. In regards to the proposed ISS mission, the 2024 deadline looks very ambitious. However, both NASA and ISRO are professional agencies and it is expected that they would not cut any corners to meet that deadline.Ajey Lele is a consultant with MP-IDSA, New Delhi.
Astronomers provided a bit of disappointing news last week about an exoplanet. Observations of TRAPPIST-1 c, one of seven planets known to orbit a red dwarf star, led astronomers to conclude the Earth-sized planet either has a tenuous atmosphere of carbon dioxide or no atmosphere at all. Before the James Webb Space Telescope observations, astronomers suspected the planet, while unlikely to be habitable, might have a dense Venus-like atmosphere. That could mean more distant planets could also lack atmospheres, if they formed in the same environment.
The TRAPPIST-1 system is one of the destinations in Under Alien Skies by Phil Plait, an astronomer and science communicator widely known as the “Bad Astronomer.” Plait takes the reader on a fascinating tour of the solar system and beyond, using destinations from the Moon to black holes to enlighten readers about aspects of astronomy and planetary science.
Plait writes in a fun, accessible style (“We humans are gloppy bags of meat, and we need water to live,” he writes on the importance of finding water ice on the Moon) but there is plenty to learn.
The use of “tour” above is more than a figure of speech: Plait structures the book as through the reader was visiting these worlds, watching a solar eclipse from the Moon or looking up at Saturn’s rings from its atmosphere (hence the “under alien skies” of its title.) That allows him to explore what we know about a variety of destinations in the solar system and galaxy. The chapter about the Moon, for example, discusses topics from lunar phases to the potential for ice at the lunar poles and the using the lunar farside for radio astronomy, shielded from the Earth’s radio chatter.
Plait writes in a fun, accessible style (“We humans are gloppy bags of meat, and we need water to live,” he writes on the importance of finding water ice on the Moon) but there is plenty to learn even for those familiar with much of the science in the book, thanks to his attention to detail. For example, on those TRAPPIST-1 worlds, 40 light-years from Earth, the positions of stars will have shifted enough to alter familiar constellations like Orion, “distorting the constellation severely while keeping it more or less recognizable.”
Some of the destinations mentioned in the book may be visited relatively soon by people: within a decade humans should be on the Moon, perhaps taking in familiar eclipses from unfamiliar vantage points. Humans may be on Mars in a few decades, and possibly on asteroids in similar time frames. But Saturn and Pluto, two other worlds in our solar system mentioned in the book, are likely beyond the reach of any readers of the book currently alive, and TRAPPIST-1 and beyond may always be out of reach. But the descriptions he provides of floating in Saturn’s atmosphere in a balloon, looking up at the rings, is fascinating enough to make you want to start saving up for a trip, just in case.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
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NASA administrator Bill Nelson made his case for the agency’s 2024 budget proposal to House appropriators in April, who are now considering significant cuts in their spending bills. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls)
A chaotic trajectory for NASA’s budget
by Jeff Foust Monday, June 19, 2023
The federal appropriations process is never easy, but some years are more difficult than others. This year appears to be shaping up to be one of the more difficult ones, particularly for NASA.
That process started in March with the release of the president’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2024. There were few surprises in that proposal, with the only new major project seeking funding is a deorbit vehicle for the International Space Station: $180 million in 2024 for a vehicle that agency officials said might cost up to $1 billion, all to provide redundancy for Russian Progress cargo spacecraft to ensure a safe deorbiting of the station around 2030.
The budget proposal sought an overall increase of 7.1% for NASA to $27.2 billion. While at first glance that might look a healthy increase, it was only roughly keeping pace with inflation over the last year.
One scenario that saw NASA’s budget cut by 22% from 2023 levels “would have devastating and potentially unrecoverable impacts,” Nelson warned.
Budget proposals are just that: proposals that are often substantially altered by Congress. (If you had a dollar for every time someone says, “The president proposes but Congress disposes,” you could fund NASA for a substantial part of next year.) That process plays out over months in the House and Senate.
However, it was clear early on that there would be problems, not for NASA specifically but for the overall appropriations process. The new Republican leadership of the House, expressing concerns about large budget deficits, said they would only agree to an increase in the debt ceiling, needed by June, if it was also accompanied by caps that could cut spending on discretionary programs, like NASA.
How much of a cut was not clear from those initial proposals. However, Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee asked agencies to outline the potential effects in two scenarios. In one, overall discretionary spending, both defense and non-defense, was reduced to 2022 levels. In the other, overall discretionary spending was reduced to 2022 levels but the cuts concentrated on non-defense agencies.
In his response, NASA administrator Bill Nelson warned of dire consequences in either scenario. In the first, NASA’s budget would drop to $24 billion. That would delay several planetary science missions already facing budget and schedule problems (see “The hard truths of NASA’s planetary program”, The Space Review, March 20, 2023) as well as other Earth and space science missions. NASA would delay work on that ISS deorbit tug and slow down funding for commercial space stations to succeed the ISS. It would also “substantially delay” Artemis 4 and end work on contracts to support later Artemis missions.
In the second scenario, NASA’s budget would fall to $19.8 billion, 22% below its 2023 level. Many of the science missions facing delays in the first scenario would now be in danger of cancellation, NASA argued. There would be a “substantially increased risk to U.S. presence” in low Earth orbit by delaying the deorbit tug and commercial space station work while also cutting back on cargo flights to the ISS. The cuts would also threaten Artemis 4 and “defer lunar exploration beyond Artemis IV.”
“To fund NASA at such a level in FY 2024 would have devastating and potentially unrecoverable impacts,” Nelson said of the latter, more severe scenario in his letter to House Democrats.
Even as the bigger debates about spending caps continued between House Republicans and the White House, NASA’s budget pressures only got worse. Appearing before Senate appropriators April 18, Nelson said he was informed that the Mars Sample Return (MSR) effort needed more funding than what was in the request for 2024, or even what was provided in 2023.
“I was just out there,” Nelson said of a visit to JPL, the lead center for Mars Sample Return, “and they’re saying they want an additional $250 million in this year—meaning in this year, existing, 2023—and 2024.” He didn’t elaborate on what prompted that increase, and the agency has not been forthcoming since that testimony on potential cost increases, noting that MSR is still working towards a review this fall that will set a formal cost and schedule.
Nelson was also forced to defend, at both that Senate hearing and one the next day by House appropriators, a potential cut in the Dragonfly mission to Saturn’s moon Titan. Nelson said that the mission was still on schedule for a 2027 launch, although project officials later said they were evaluating the effects of the proposed cut on the mission.
During the Senate hearing, Nelson stated several times that, despite a record budget of $8.26 billion for science proposed for the agency for 2024, tough decisions about missions were necessary. “In the largest science budget ever, you can’t fit 10 pounds of potatoes in a five-pound sack,” he said.
That 2024 request assumed a spending increase that looked doubtful amid the debt ceiling debate. “A 22% cut or a continuing resolution that would leave the funding at the ’23 level would cause a slowdown of programs at NASA across the board,” Nelson warned House appropriators.
“In the largest science budget ever, you can’t fit 10 pounds of potatoes in a five-pound sack,” Nelson said.
Those debt ceiling negotiations—conducted under the threat of a government default in early June if there was no deal—concluded with an agreement over Memorial Day weekend. In exchange for suspending the debt ceiling through 2024, non-defense discretionary spending would be held at 2023 levels for fiscal year 2024 and increased 1% for 2025. It was a reduction in real spending power when accounting for inflation, but far less than the worst-case scenarios from the spring.
The caps are not across-the-board measures: appropriators can increase or decrease spending for individual agencies or departments, and their individual programs, within those caps. However, NASA officials now recognize that the 7% increase they requested for 2024 seems unlikely.
“We do have to face the reality of the debt limit ceiling agreement and what might happen to our 2024 budget request,” Pam Melroy, NASA deputy administrator, said at a June 7 meeting of the National Academies’ Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board and Space Studies Board. “We recognize that it’s unlikely we will get the full request, and we know that’s going to create challenges for us in the future.”
She didn’t elaborate on the specific challenges, beyond stating that NASA will have “some hard decisions this year.”
Other NASA officials echoed those sentiments. “What we would cut now, I couldn’t tell you,” Ken Bowersox, NASA associate administrator for space operations, said at a Space Transportation Association event June 8.
That uncertainty stems from the fact that House and Senate appropriators have not started work on most of their spending bills, including the commerce, justice and science (CJS) one that funds NASA. Only last week did House appropriators approve how much money would be available for each of the dozen spending bills they will consider, known as 302(b) allocations.
That House decision, though, might cause NASA to dust off those worst-case scenarios from the spring. Rather than approve allocations for non-defense spending bills that, in sum, would be the same as for 2023, the Republican-led committee opted for significantly lower allocations for many of those bills.
“While the Fiscal Responsibility Act set the topline spending limit, it does not require that we mark up our bills to that level,” Rep. Kay Granger (R-TX), chair of the committee, said in an opening statement at the June 14 hearing, referring to the bill that raised the debt ceiling and enacted spending caps. “Simply put, the debt ceiling bill set a ceiling, not a floor, for fiscal year 2024 bills.”
Those 302(b) allocations, approved by the committee on a party-line vote, would provide $58.7 billion for the overall CJS bill, 28% less than 2023 spending. There is no insight into how that might be distributed among the various agencies included in the bill, but it is hard to imagine a scenario where NASA does suffer significant reductions to some of its programs.
The only thing certain for the next several months is that NASA is unlikely to get all that it asked for in 2024, or even possibly all that it got in 2023.
That said, there is still months to go in the appropriations process. Some Republican members of the committee have claimed that “clawbacks” of spending elsewhere, such as unspent pandemic relief aid, that was part of the Fiscal Responsibility Act might offset some of those cuts, but they have not provided details. Appropriators have not announced when they will take up a version of the CJS spending bill.
The Senate Appropriations Committee is scheduled to approve its 302(b) allocations later in the week, and the Democratic-led committee is expected to stick close to the spending cap level. That will make reconciling the House and Senate spending bills challenging, to say the least.
In the past, such a scenario might end up being resolved with a year-long continuing resolution holding funding at 2023 levels. Given that would be close to the best-case scenario for many agencies, though, there’s a risk a divided Congress might not be able to pass that, prompting a government shutdown until one side or the other yielded.
The only thing certain for the next several months is that NASA is unlikely to get all that it asked for in 2024, or even possibly all that it got in 2023. The questions will be what parts of the agency bear the brunt of any reductions and how that will affect priorities ranging from returning humans to the Moon to studying the rest of the universe, as well as our own planet.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
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The United Kingdom is focusing more on both civil and military space, including establishing a UK Space Command. (credit: UK Space Command)
The implications of the UK’s National Space Strategy on special operations
by Jack Sharpe, Fotios Moustakis, Markos Trichas, and Damian Terrill Monday, June 19, 2023
Space capabilities have become an integral part of our daily lives, yet their significance often goes unnoticed by many. While space has captivated generations and driven nations to push technological boundaries, it remains an unsung enabler of modern life. The National Space Strategy (NSS) of the British Government is a testament to the criticality and potential opportunities presented by space. This document positions Great Britain as a pioneering force within the international spacefaring community, showcasing the UK government’s commitment to space exploration, technology, and research. However, the NSS falls short in terms of signaling increased capital expenditure, setting concrete milestones, and establishing realistic outcomes. This article will discuss the NSS, its potential impacts for UK special operations, and why UK Defence must integrate space with special operations planning and activity.
What is in the NSS and what is missing
The NSS outlines four distinct phases in its journey: the countdown phase, the ignition phase, the thrust phase, and the orbit phase. While it can be argued that the first two phases have already passed, we are currently transitioning into the thrust phase, which spans from 2023 to 2030. As Bill Gates (1996) astutely observed, humanity tends to overestimate what can be achieved in the short term but underestimates what can be accomplished in the long term. Consequently, it is imperative that the NSS undergoes periodic reviews to ensure its relevance and effectiveness.
This document positions Great Britain as a pioneering force within the international spacefaring community… However, the NSS falls short in terms of signaling increased capital expenditure, setting concrete milestones, and establishing realistic outcomes.
Despite its nuanced messaging, the NSS underscores significant threats within the space domain. The strategy places great emphasis on great power competition, which directly affects Great Britain’s security. As the number of state and commercially operated space objects continues to rise, space is becoming increasingly congested and contested (Marones & Nones, 2022). Consequently, states compete for limited resources and often employ cunning methods to undermine their adversaries’ access to space.
Miscalculations in the space domain can undoubtedly lead to escalation and potential hostilities (Harrison et al., 2017). The NSS endeavors to mitigate this risk by enhancing Great Britain’s global influence and diplomacy (HMG, 2021). By setting a global example and rallying the United Nations and other space-governing agencies, Great Britain aims to discourage the weaponization of space (Defence Space Strategy: Operationalising the Space Domain, 2022).
It is important to note, however, that space is already militarized, meaning it is used for military purposes, although it is not openly weaponized, with weapons platforms stationed in space (Zwart & Henderson, 2021). Furthermore, the Outer Space Treaty (UNOOSA, 1966) does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in space; it only prohibits weapons of mass destruction. Agreed norms of behavior in space typically focus on preventing the proliferation or development of weaponry. This is exemplified by initiatives pursued by Russia and China, such as the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (NTI, 2022).
Similarly, Great Britain has outlined plans for the development and procurement of space capabilities for military purposes (Defence Space Strategy: Operationalising the Space Domain, 2022), indicating a national interest in the militarization of space. Whether this interest pertains to Earth observation (EO) and intelligence gathering, missile launch detection, or enabling precision-guided munitions (PGM) remains undisclosed. The weaponization of space is an intriguing subject, as it could provide significant advantages over adversaries lacking access to space weapons. However, it could also be argued that such actions violate the Outer Space Treaty. Nevertheless, it is plausible that these capabilities are being explored, despite states’ apparent opposition to deploying weapons in outer space.
The NSS consistently highlights collaboration and coherence as essential elements for success in space. By encouraging investment, fostering partnerships, establishing bilateral relationships, and promoting systematic concurrence, Great Britain aims to align nations sharing similar global values. The UK-Australia space bridge serves as an exemplar of this approach (“‘Space Bridge’ Across the World,” 2021). This partnership facilitates trade, investment, and collaboration between the two nations, strengthening ties and creating opportunities for bilateral agreements on the global stage. Additionally, it enhances the collective ability of both countries to compete with other powerful states (US Department of State, 2022). As the West pivots toward the Indo-Pacific and engages in regional power competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such partnerships become increasingly relevant (Gilday, 2022; “The Integrated Review of Security,” 2021). Space is a domain of warfare and political influence and will remain integral to terrestrial diplomacy. Neglecting space will put any nation at a disadvantage.
While the NSS discusses an end-to-end approach to space, it does not provide a definitive plan for delivering its various components. The governance and security of space assets must address challenging areas such as the protection of people, processes, technologies, and information (confidentiality, integrity, and availability). Ensuring the security of our people, talent, technology, and information is of utmost importance. Stricter regulations regarding foreign trade and cybersecurity standards for space assets must be considered. The notion put forward by Pavur and Martinovic (2022) that satellites maintain security through obsolescence is no longer valid, particularly as these systems increasingly integrate with the Internet Protocol backbone of the modern Internet. Addressing these potential vulnerabilities is crucial, especially for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the wider security infrastructure of the UK, as they directly impact the protection of national interests.
What significance does the NSS have for special operations?
The National Security Strategy (NSS) presents a valuable opportunity for the MoD by allocating £5 billion ($6.4 billion) to Space Command over the next decade. Additionally, there is an additional £1.4 billion earmarked for acquiring and developing space technologies (HMG, 2021). This demonstrates the UK government’s commitment to sponsoring and supporting space capabilities for military and security purposes.
While the NSS discusses an end-to-end approach to space, it does not provide a definitive plan for delivering its various components.
It is important to note that this increased investment does not directly benefit special operations. Despite that, special operations forces play a crucial role as the MoD aims to position the UK as a leading member of the international space community. Special operations rely on cutting-edge technologies to gain a competitive advantage on the battlefield. The advancements in space capabilities have made them more affordable and sophisticated than ever before. These capabilities enable special operations forces to leverage space-based intelligence gathering, such as electrical observation and radiofrequency (RF) collection, for gaining intelligence, disrupting communications, and operating in data-rich battlespaces of the future.
Usually, there is not a direct correlation between political strategy and special operations, and when there is correlation, policymakers can avoid explaining special operations publicly (Haynes, 2021). Special operations can serve as a signal of political commitment and capability through their actions, but without other supporting elements such as PESTLE (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental factors), special operations forces rarely achieve decisive strategic effects (Long, 2016). However, special operations can deliver decisive tactical actions with strategic implications when employed appropriately. To identify actions or supporting effects that can provide strategic advantages, it is essential to analyze strategy documents carefully. Furthermore, special operations forces have a high tolerance for risk and capital expenditure. This attitude is likely to facilitate the utilization of traditionally strategic space capabilities for tactical purposes.
Next steps
Special operations command needs to comprehend the opportunities offered by space capabilities to effectively capitalize on their unique strengths. It is widely recognized within the special operations community that these forces can effectively target the most hardened objectives in challenging environments to deliver critical effects on behalf of the British government. The first step is for organizations involved in special operations to identify a target set that encompasses these hardened targets in difficult locations. Subsequently, they should determine which space-based assets can facilitate the following principles:
Gain intelligence to achieve insight.
Gain intelligence to achieve an effect.
Create an effect for intelligence purposes.
Perform an effect operation to achieve a desired outcome.
Special operations forces primarily focus on principles one and two but can also pursue principles three and four if the political situation permits. A technical planning session should determine the intelligence and effects requirements, leading to the identification of the technologies that can support special operations.
The NSS offers a valuable platform to disseminate information about current MoD and security requirements within the space sector, while also influencing research and development trends. Such active involvement can potentially provide the UK with a competitive edge in the global market (considering the inevitable global capability requirements), enabling the delivery of exceptional military capabilities and technical advancements. Achieving these objectives is the primary focus of the NSS.
Conclusion
Similar to a business pursuing its vision, the NSS should periodically review its strategic roadmap. This approach ensures government accountability for the proposal and solidifies the NSS as a framework capable of withstanding changes in governmental leadership. Maintaining a long-term strategy will secure Great Britain’s success in space, prevent indecisiveness, and foster the establishment of tangible goals. Given its relative infancy, the NSS currently lacks the maturity of a fully-fledged strategy, limiting its capacity to achieve the proposed long-term objectives. (A strategic plan defining tactical detail is necessary to further the aims of the NSS.) Various government and industry actors will likely need to interpret the NSS to develop their organizational strategies within its overarching framework. While this diversity of interpretation may encourage innovation, it may not be conducive to a coherent space sector in Great Britain, as envisioned by the NSS. Nevertheless, the NSS must reflect a long-term aspiration for Great Britain, and the British government should assess the country’s collective progress to ensure the achievement of NSS targets or take necessary remedial actions.
Overall, the NSS signifies a significant step forward in recognizing the potential of space and integrating it into national security efforts. By capitalizing on its provisions, special operations can harness space capabilities to enhance their effectiveness.
In conclusion, while the National Space Strategy may lack granularity, it signifies the acknowledgment of space as a crucial domain that can significantly impact diplomacy and security. It demonstrates Great Britain’s commitment to achieving meaningful outcomes in its space endeavors, emphasizing the importance of meticulous planning along the way. By serving as a governance framework, the NSS aims to guide organizational planning and emphasizes the integrative nature of space across the Ministry of Defence and its partners. It is imperative that the NSS is viewed as a long-term investment, with incremental reviews playing a vital role in ensuring its success.
For special operations, the NSS presents promising opportunities. By aligning closer with organizations like Space Command and leveraging advanced capabilities offered by the commercial sector, special operation forces can effectively employ space assets in tactical environments. It is crucial for these organizations to develop their space arsenal in accordance with the NSS’s outlined progression, striving to surpass its objectives. Additionally, the NSS should leverage investments made by the MoD, recognizing that space assets will continue to be pivotal in maintaining both tactical and strategic advantages, contributing to British security.
While beyond the scope of this article, it is worth considering further research on the weaponization of space, distinct from its militarization. Overall, the NSS signifies a significant step forward in recognizing the potential of space and integrating it into national security efforts. By capitalizing on its provisions, special operations can harness space capabilities to enhance their effectiveness, while keeping in mind the broader implications and considerations associated with space exploration and utilization.
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) (2021).Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. RES 2222 (XXI).
Zwart, M., Henderson, S. (2021). Commercial and Military Uses of Outer Space. Springer Nature Singapore.
Jack Sharpe is a Major in His Majesty’s Royal Marines and a PhD candidate in Politics at the University of Plymouth. His thesis focuses on the impact of space and cyber domains on maritime security. More broadly, he is a qualified cybersecurity and technology leader, comfortable operating and engaging at the CxO level.
Dr. Fotios Moustakis is an Associate Professor in Strategic Studies and the Director of the Centre for Sea Power and Strategy at the University of Plymouth. Additionally, he holds the position of MA Programme Manager at the MA in Applied Strategy and International Security program at the Hellenic National Defence College.
Dr. Markos Trichas is the Head of the UK National Eyes Only Space programs at Airbus Defence and Space and a Research Fellow at the University of Plymouth. Prior to joining Airbus, he worked at Harvard CFA/NASA CXC, STFC RAL, and Imperial College London. He holds a Ph.D. in Astrophysics from Imperial College London.
Damian Terrill is Special Projects Advisor at Airbus Defence and Space. Damian has a background in behavioral science. His research focuses on the role of space-based technology in defense and multi-domain threats to technological assets.
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The Space Age is conventionally defined as starting with the launch of Sputnik in 1957. There was, of course, an extensive history leading up to that launch, with some preferring to define the era as starting with the first successful suborbital V-2 launch almost exactly 15 years earlier. But even before that there had been decades of development and dreaming about rockets for space travel.
That prehistorical Space Age is the subject of From the Earth to Mars, a new book by Jeffrey Manber, a longtime space entrepreneur currently at Voyager Space. The book, the first in a series, examines efforts in Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1920s to lay the groundwork for a spaceflight industry and, as the subtitle suggests, correct misperceptions about that era.
For much of the 1920s, interest in spaceflight was outside of government, by individuals and organizations, with some expectation it might develop privately, like aviation.
The book consists of two sections, or episodes, the first examining growing interest in spaceflight in Germany in the 1920s and the second in the Soviet Union in the same decade. In both countries there were people working on the scientific and technical underpinnings of spaceflight, as well as those who were popularizing it to broader audiences, even as liquid-fueled rockets themselves were in their infancy. That led to events like a Russian space travel exhibition attended by more than 10,000 people over three months in 1927 and the famous German movie Die Frau Im Mond that, among other things, invented the countdown.
There are many familiar figures in the book, like Hermann Oberth, Willy Ley, and Konstantin Tsiolkovsky. However, the book also highlights some people who, while not well-known today, played key roles in that era as well. One of them is Thea von Harbou, wife of Fritz Lang, director of Die Frau Im Mond. She wrote a novel of the same name upon which the film was based; that novel was based on what she learned about spaceflight from Oberth and Ley. She was also, Manber notes, a member of the Nazi party, and he speculates she wrote the book and helped create the movie to raise awareness about the military potential of rocketry.
Another such individual was Robert Esnault-Pelterie, a French aviation pioneer who turned his attention to spaceflight. He is credited for popularizing the term “astronautics” and sponsoring a prize for advancements in that field. (Oberth was the first winner.) He also predicted that the costs of spaceflight would be so high that only governments could bankroll it.
Manber treats that development with some regret. For much of the 1920s, interest in spaceflight was outside of government, by individuals and organizations, with some expectation it might develop privately, like aviation. (The lunar expedition in Die Frau Im Mond was a private, not government, mission.) When governments in Germany and elsewhere started supporting, and then taking over, rocket development, it becomes almost an “original sin” for spaceflight in his view, taking it off a more commercial path. That’s illustrated in one passage where Manber recalls a brief conversation with Oberth in 1985 in Houston; Manber asks about contemporary commercial space developments and Oberth responded that he had predicted it decades ago, only to have governments intervene.
That exchange is literally illustrated: the book includes some scenes in graphic novel format. It is an interesting hybrid approach of conventional text, illustrations and graphic novel scenes that works well, keeping the book flowing well.
Besides describing the roles of German and Russian spaceflight pioneers, the book is also a corrective for some American views of spaceflight. The United States did not share the enthusiasm of Germany or the Soviet Union about space in the 1920s, despite the work of Robert Goddard. That work, while closely followed overseas, was at times ridiculed in the US, particularly in an infamous New York Times editorial. While the Times issued a correction in 1969 at the time of Apollo 11, Manber argues it contributed to an incorrect belief that there is a direct line from Goddard to Apollo. A more direct path, of course, comes from those efforts in Europe, particularly Germany. That, he promises, will be explored in future episodes of his book.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
The 50th anniversary of the Apollo landings on the Moon was an opportunity for historical reflection and reassessment as well as thinking about the future. But surely, six months after the golden anniversary of the last Apollo landing, Apollo 17, that opportunity has passed.
Maybe not, at least on the timelines of academia. The new book After Apollo (not to be confused with John Logsdon’s 2015 book After Apollo? on Richard Nixon’s impact on post-Apollo space policy) had its roots in a symposium by Hofstra University to mark the 50th anniversary of Apollo 11. It evidently took some time to get the participants to turn their presentations into essays that are compiled in the book.
That eclectic collection would be fine if the essays offered new historical insights or analysis. By and large, though, they do not
The book’s subtitle, “Cultural Legacies of the Race to the Moon,” suggests the general theme of the book: a review not of the Apollo program itself (although the book’s first chapter is essentially an overview of Apollo) but of the effect it had on broader culture. The result is a bit scattershot: one essay examines the role chemistry played in Apollo, while another looks at how immigrants helped NASA during Apollo and beyond. Other contributions range from how IMAX movies were used to portray Apollo missions to how women were portrayed in space-related entertainment and fashion during that era. The through line connecting those essays is meandering, to say the least.
That eclectic collection would be fine if the essays offered new historical insights or analysis. By and large, though, they do not. Many of the essays trod familiar ground, from the partnership between Walt Disney and Wernher von Braun on envisioning spaceflight in the 1950s to the undercurrent of dissent about spending so much money on the race to the Moon even as Apollo 11 was going to the Moon. The essays rely heavily on secondary sources and contemporary news accounts rather than historical archives and other primary sources that might offer something new.
The conclusions that some authors reach are also suspect. The essay about spending for Apollo cites an “infamous seven-hour debate” in the Senate about proposals to both cut and increase NASA spending, both of which are rejected. The “intensity and longevity” of the debate, the author concludes, “serve to illustrate a political trend marking the beginning of steep reductions in federal funding for the space program.” But that debate, according to the article it cites, took place in 1970. By that point NASA spending had already fallen by nearly half from its mid-1960s peak when adjusting for inflation; hardly, then, the “beginning” of steep reductions.
In the book’s introduction, the editors state that the essay on Disney and von Braun shows that President Eisenhower used the “Man in Space” episode they created “to help convince skeptical generals of the need of a government program to develop the capability to launch satellites.” But the author of that essay notes that the claim, from Disney animator Ward Kimball, was “difficult to verify” by other historians who called it “partially accurate” at best; the essay doesn’t provide any new information to verify or reject the claim.
There are a couple interesting essays in the book, such as looking at how filmmakers used IMAX to depict Apollo missions in the documentary Magnificent Desolation and the film First Man, as well as the influence of the space race on women’s fashion and in films and television. (Unfortunately, the latter essay, while describing many space-age fashions of the 1960s, includes few photos of them, leaving the reader to have to imagine them.) That’s not enough, though, to justify the book, particularly at the extraordinarily high price set by the academic publisher. The last words on Apollo likely haven’t been written, but maybe it’s time to take a breather.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
Peggy Whitson spent 665 days in space on three long-duration ISS missions before a much shorter visit in May commanding the Ax-2 private astronaut mission. (credit: Axiom Space)
Peggy Whitson and Rayyanah Barnawi doing research on the ISS during Ax-2. (credit: Axiom Space)
Taranjit Sandhu (second from right), India’s ambassador to the US, signs the Artemis Accords June 21 as NASA Administrator Bill Nelson looks on. Also participating are Nancy Jackson, deputy assistant secretary of state for India, and Krunal Joshi, ISRO space counsellor. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls)India joins the Artemis Accordsby Ajey Lele
NASA administrator Bill Nelson made his case for the agency’s 2024 budget proposal to House appropriators in April, who are now considering significant cuts in their spending bills. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls)
The United Kingdom is focusing more on both civil and military space, including establishing a UK Space Command. (credit: UK Space Command)
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