Mars Has Twice As Many Close Calls With Dangerous Asteroids As Earth Does

Accident-Prone

In 2013, a meteor fell to Earth in Siberia, injuring more than 1,000 people and causing more than $33 million in damage to infrastructure. Though this type of event is rare, asteroids present the biggest risk to planets.

Now, scientists have found that Mars is even more at risk: A recent study shows that our neighboring planet faces twice as many close calls with potentially dangerous asteroids than Earth does.

It’s obvious to scientists that the Red Planet is more at risk because it lies right next to the Main Belt, a stretch of asteroids and other space rocks flowing between Mars and Jupiter. But the risk had not been quantified yet.

A team of astronomers at Nanjing University in China conducted simulations to determine how many asteroids get dangerously close to Mars each year. They labeled the rocks “close approach potentially hazardous asteroids”, or “CAPHAs” for short.

The simulations incorporated the Yarkovsky effect, a force caused by sunlight that makes asteroids smaller than 25 miles in diameter either slow down or speed up, and potentially drift.

The Yarkovsky effect can send some asteroids into gaps in the belt, where gravitational tugs from neighboring super-planets Jupiter and Saturn can kick the rocks out of orbit and toward other planets in the inner solar system, Live Science explained.

Mars is the first target on this collision course. The researchers found that about 52 CAPHAs skim past it yearly, which is 2.6 times more than the CAPHAs threatening Earth.

“As human visits to Mars become more frequent, the threat posed by Mars-CAPHAs may increasingly be taken seriously,” said Yufan Zhou, lead author of the study.

But other scientists opined that this was a problem only secondary to the risk of CAPHAs hitting Earth.

“Earth is still the place to focus such discovery efforts since Earth-approaching asteroids are the ones that pose an impact hazard to where humanity is actually located,” astronomer Rob Weryk told Popular Science.

Air Launching Spy Satellites During The Cold War

A typical F-4 Phantom II. The NRO studied using the fighter jet as an air-launch platform for a crisis reconnaissance system. (credit: National Archives)National Reconnaissance Program crisis photography concepts, part 3: Axumiteby Joseph T. Page II Monday, June 10, 2024 On November 3, 1970, the Deputy Director of the NRO, Dr. Fumio Robert “Bob” Naka, gave a series of presentations to the staff of Mr. Ray S. Cline, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research at the State Department. The presentations briefed capabilities within the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) to monitor the Middle East Cease Fire Zone, established during the War of Attrition (1967–1970), with KH-8 Gambit systems and future capabilities such as KH-9 Hexagon. Additionally, Dr. Naka briefed concepts for future crisis reconnaissance systems, based upon the likelihood of further military action with little or no warning.[1]While each concept had advantages and drawbacks, all of them were a mishmash of flight-proven equipment from previous NRP systems. One system in particular, named Axumite, stood out from the others based simply upon its planned satellite launcher: a F-4 Phantom II fighter aircraft.Axumite Launch Vehicle Configuration. (credit: NRO)Rapid response satellite launch platformThe Axumite concept focused on quick reaction from a photographic satellite system launched from an F-4 aircraft launched from a Pacific air base.[2] After a short trip to orbit, the satellite-borne camera would execute an orbital path with for a one-time target coverage and re-enter over either the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean, with the film whisked away for imagery processing on the West or East Coast respectively.[3]Previous systems covered in this series (Corona Six-Pack, Pinto) relied upon proven space launch vehicles that were previously adapted by the NRP, such as the Atlas-F intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). These system concepts inherited the limiting factors based upon the choice of booster, such as launch processing timelines for the Atlas-F and pad location at Vandenberg AFB, California.Proposed carriage of Axumite launcher on an F-4 Phantom II. (credit: NRO)Using an aircraft as a satellite launcher altered these planning considerations to ones inherent to the platform, namely lift capacity, range distances, and bed down locations. The NRO and CIA had previously investigated the idea of using an SR-71 aircraft as a satellite launcher in 1962, but ultimately abandoned the concept. (see “Blackbirds and black satellites: the A-12 OXCART as a satellite launcher,” The Space Review, January 3, 2022.)Axumite’s design relied upon proven hardware from a variety of US launch platforms, from the reliable to the obscure to even cancelled ones.These considerations, however, were well understood within the paradigm of rapid response for crisis reconnaissance as other platforms within the NRP—such as the SR-71, U-2, and D-21—had been used for this mission for many years. Axumite’s design augmented these systems by boosting the camera and film above the atmosphere and maintaining the launching aircraft outside of the engagement envelope of threat missiles and radars, while also bringing the photographic imagery back to national leaders within hours.The PhantomAxumite’s planned satellite launcher, the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, was originally developed for the US Navy for fleet defense and later adopted by the US Air Force for both air-to-air and air-to-ground (bombing) roles. With more than 5,000 airframes manufactured by McDonnell Douglas from 1958 through the late 1970s, and the aircraft’s prominent role during the Vietnam War, F-4 operations were well integrated into airbases around the world, providing readily available take-off locations, and operational security (OPSEC) considerations with the ubiquitous platform.Franken-rocketAs designed, the Axumite launch vehicle consisted of a four-stage rocket, with solid strap-on rockets for thrust augmentation. Based upon the documentation released by the NRO, Axumite’s design relied upon proven hardware from a variety of US launch platforms.[3] Pieces of the launch vehicle, as shown in the table, were selected from programs ranging from the reliable (Thor-Delta, STAR upper stage series), to the obscure (the Apollo RCS thruster), and even cancelled ones (the Skybolt missile).Strap-OnStage 1Stage 2Stage 3Stage 4MotorThor-Delta 2nd StageSkybolt 1st StageSTAR-37D (TE-M-364-3)STAR-26B (TE-M-442-4)R-4DFuel-SolidSolidSolidSolidLiquidWeight90002625900260VariableThe reliable Thor-Delta series provided Axumite’s strap-on rockets for thrust during initial launch; one other Axumite-related document stated these solid motors from SLV-1 Scout rockets. The GAM-87 Skybolt (retroactively designated AGM-48) was an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) designed to provide quick reaction nuclear delivery during crisis situations. Ultimately Skybolt was cancelled during the Kennedy Administration with the advent of the SM-80 (later LGM-30) Minuteman ICBM. The Skybolt program was cancelled on December 22, 1962, with the last missile launched the next day on December 23, presumably leaving plenty of spare Skybolt parts around for reuse within Axumite.Use of the R-4D is curious from a space history perspective. The Apollo Service Module used four R-4D thrusters in each reaction control system (RCS) quad setup around the spacecraft, using nitrogen tetroxide and monomethyl hydrazine as hypergolic fuel.Proposed 18-inch Petzval Lens design. (credit: NRO)Camera requirementsAxumite’s characteristics, as shown in the NRO files, are based on camera requirements, unlike the specifically identified optical systems within the Corona Six-Pack or PINTO concepts. One document states Axumite’s camera “…would be a 32-inch focal length scaled up version of the CORONA camera yielding three-foot resolution at 75 nautical miles.”At this point during the NRO’s development timeline, rapid retrieval of imagery was seemingly more critical than ground resolved distance.At the time of Axumite’s development, Corona had flown the Corona-M/MURAL (KH-4), J-1 (KH-4A), and J-3 panoramic camera (KH-4B), so it is unclear which camera version was being referenced. These Itek-designed cameras (and the earlier C Triple Prime) all used a 24-inch (61-centimeter) Petzval lens (f/3.5). However, the reproduced Axumite camera specification shows a modified 18-inch (46-centimeter) Petzval as a minimum focal length, likely indicating that the camera chosen was not government “off-the-shelf” (GOTS) equipment from the NRP. To add to the confusion, the Axumite briefing included six candidate camera parameters, along with five listed within an order of preference.Axumite’s camera objectives stated an estimated Ground Resolved Distance (GRD) of 5–7 feet (1.5–2.1 meters), greater than the KH-4B Corona satellites flying around that time, but less than the KH-7 Gambit or KH-8 Gambit-3. However, the “White Paper on Crisis Reconnaissance” provided metric bookends to the usefulness of rapidly obtained imagery:“Two to three-foot ground resolution distance. [Redacted] twelve-inch GRD may be required for tactical utility. In some cases, GRD up to 15 feet may be useful.” [6] [Emphasis added]At this point during the NRO’s development timeline, rapid retrieval of imagery was seemingly more critical than GRD. But one can wonder if the inversely proportional trade-off between “fast” [processing] and “better” [resolution] was worth the less-refined pictures one would obtain more rapidly.Axumite’s designers, however, recognized the engineering adage of “Better is the enemy of good enough,” when declaring “Best resolution obtainable within resource constrains is desired.”Mission Coverage from Specified Launch Locations. (credit: NRO)Location, location, locationDue to the launcher aircraft’s requirement to recover at a land-base after launch and specific orbital inclinations required for target coverage, only a handful of US-controlled airbases fit the bill.[4] With a posigrade (eastward launch) between 65- and 75-degrees inclination, the entire Eurasian continent was accessible during the low Earth circular orbit from the following proposed launch locations[8]:Hawaii (likely Hickam Air Force Base)Johnston IslandWake IslandGuamOkinawaOrbital considerations required the system to dump itself into the ocean if it suffered any catastrophic failure, to prevent re-entry over the Soviet Union or People’s Republic of China. Inclination constraints were based on both launch and recovery locations, allowing the target to be photographed on the first, second, or third revolution (no later), allowing a re-entry recovery from any of the five launch locations within a maximum of five revolutions. Not all bases could support recovery from other specific locations, and no base could support a launch-and-recovery at their own location based on the Earth’s rotation rate during the elapsed mission time.Recovery forces were not identified but would presumably use assets from the 6594th Test Group, the NRO’s go-to organization for mid-air capsule snatching. Many of the same considerations analyzed for recovery of the PINTO system, such as extreme weather (e.g. hurricanes), film processing times, and location of recovery forces, would similarly affect Axumite’s recovery operations. (see “National Reconnaissance Program crisis photography concepts, part 2: PINTO”, The Space Review, February 6, 2023)Review of the information provided by the NRO leaves many questions unanswered, with an uneasy feeling that the concept was more half-baked than the diagrams and charts show.Critical planning considerations for crisis reconnaissance photography included the ability to get the images back to Earth, processed, and into the hands of national leadership. Aside from generally mentioning the Atlantic and Pacific recovery locations, no specific processing locations were identified. The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) or Westover AFB’s Air Force Special Projects Production Facility were likely candidates for East Coast processing, along with the Overseas Processing and Interpretation Center – Asia (OPIC-A).[5]A few years later—based on no active NRP missions in either hemisphere requiring dedicated support—the NRO bowed out of supporting the OPIC facilities in Asia and Europe altogether.[5] Whether this disengagement of OPIC support was a fait accompli during the development of these rapid-response concepts (Axumite, Pinto, Fastback) is unknown.Axumite’s Orbital Timeline. (credit: NRO)Axumite’s abortive attemptFrom the paltry documentation within NRO records, there apparently was no appetite for the Axumite concept. Some of the previously mentioned quick reaction capabilities offered to the NRP in the early 1970s illustrate innovative in situ thinking on the part of planners during the period. The Axumite system shows an extension of this thinking, with planners pulling the most responsive pieces of various weapon systems to get a rocket and its camera and film payloads into orbit within minutes of notification.Review of the information provided by the NRO leaves many questions unanswered, with an uneasy feeling that the concept was more half-baked than the diagrams and charts show. If additional Axumite material remains within Boeing’s archives (inheriting McDonnell Douglas’ legacy) or the NRO’s Archival Research Center (NROARC), more questions may be answered in the future.While Dr. Naka’s “eye-opening” look covering these potential systems for crisis situations got the attention of the State Department staffers, Cline was not convinced. Financial considerations, technological effort, and lessening return on investment from film-based systems kept Cline’s attention on the “real-time readout system,” later described as the electro-optical imaging (EOI) system (Zaman/Kennen). Even Naka’s reassurances on the capabilities of the KH-9 Hexagon—scheduled for a 1971 launch—did not sway Cline, who worried about the authorities attached to Hexagon’s “call down” (re-entry vehicle return) capability, citing the bureaucratic complexity in making and executing such a decision. In his mind, Cline saw EOI as the only way to go for the State Department’s intelligence needs.NotesNaka, F. Robert. “Memo. Subject: Approval of ExCom Minutes (ExCom-M-24).” 18 February 1971. NRO FOIA For All.Sweeney, Edwin. “Memorandum for Dr. McLucas. Subject: State Department Briefing.” 4 November 1970. NRO FOIA For All.No Author. “Axumite Briefing Summary.” No date. NRO FOIA For All.No Author. Point Paper. “Should the NRO acquire an interim sys with improved response time prior to EOI?” No date. NRO FOIA For All.Kulpa, John. “Memo. Subject: Overseas Processing and Interpretation Centers (OPICs).” 19 April 1973. NRO Staff Records Collection.No author. “White Paper on Crisis Reconnaissance.” No date. NRO Archives. 2022 Sunshine Week Releases.Regarding the image quality, the diagrams came from the referenced material in the links below. Blame the NRO’s scanner or carbon copies.Clark Air Base, Philippines is mentioned briefly on one target coverage chart, but no other amplifying information was listed within the presentation, leading to a conclusion Clark was not a serious contender for Axumite.Joseph T. Page II is a space historian and freelance writer located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He is the author of the forthcoming Peterson Space Force Base Through Time (Fonthill, 2024). Joe can be reached at joe (at) josephtpageii (dot) com.

Hubble Limps Along

The Hubble Space Telescope at the end of the final shuttle servicing mission to it in May 2009. (credit: NASA)

by Jeff Foust
Monday, June 10, 2024

For months, one of the three remaining working gyroscopes on the Hubble Space Telescope, designated Gyro 3, has been malfunctioning. A problem with the gyro would trigger a safe mode, taking the telescope offline for days while engineers worked to get the gyro working again, allowing observations to resume.

“We do not see Hubble as being on its last legs,” Crouse concluded.

“Gyro 3, to be frank, has always performed a little bit out-of-family on orbit,” said Patrick Crouse, project manager for Hubble at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, during a media telecon last week. “It’s been ongoing work since 2018 on the operations team to learn to live with this gyro and make the best of it.”

However, it’s no longer possible to live with Gyro 3. On May 24, that gyro malfunctioned again, putting Hubble into another safe mode. A week and a half later, NASA announced that it concluded that, unlike previous malfunctions, the gyro could not be brought back into service.

“After completing a series of tests and carefully considering our options, we have made the decision that we will transition Hubble to operate using only one of its three remaining gyros,” Mark Clampin, director of NASA’s astrophysics division, said on the call.

NASA decided to implement a plan created years ago for just such a scenario, as the telescope’s aging gyros—installed on the final shuttle servicing mission 15 years ago—began to fail. Once Hubble fell below the three gyros needed for normal operations, engineers would switch the spacecraft to operate with just a single gyro, putting the other into reserve.

Doing so is intended to extend the life of Hubble: rather than run both gyros simultaneously, one can be turned off until the other fails, conserving its lifetime. The two remaining gyros are both “enhanced” models with lifetimes five times longer than the standard gyro’s 50,000-year lifetime. One has 142,000 hours and the other nearly 90,000 hours, and neither has experienced issues like those that plagued Gyro 3.

That gives NASA confidence that Hubble, launched in 1990, can continue to operate for perhaps another decade. Crouse said there was at least a70% chance that at least one of the remaining two gyros should still be working in the mid-2030s. Other Hubble systems, including its instruments, are also working well. “We do not see Hubble as being on its last legs,” he concluded.

Switching to the single-gyro mode, though, has drawbacks, primarily because Hubble cannot shift from one target to another as quickly or precisely as before. Crouse said that while Hubble can perform observations an average of 85 orbits per week in normal operations, that will be reduced to 74 orbits a week in single-gyro mode, a 12% loss of observing time.

“We don’t want stop using Hubble and we don’t want to stop using Chandra,” Clampin said. “We want to find a cheaper way to do it.”

The single-gyro mode also means a larger portion of the sky will no longer be observable at a given time because of a bigger exclusion zone to avoid accidently observing the Sun. That will primarily affect “time-domain” astronomy where observations of a particular object at a specific time are needed; NASA noted that the whole sky will still be visible over the course of the year.

The single-gyro mode also prevents observations of objects close to the Earth that require better tracking. Crouse said Hubble will no longer be able to observe objects closer than Mars, like the Moon and some near Earth asteroids, but noted such observations account for only about one percent of recent Hubble investigations.

Astronomers have been dreading the inevitable switch to single-gyro observations because of those restrictions. A 2016 study by a team at the Space Telescope Science Institute, which handles Hubble science operations, estimated a 25 percent reduction in “scientific productivity” of Hubble should it operate with one or two gyros, although the paper didn’t elaborate on how such productivity was defined.

Clampin, asked about the study in the call, said he was not familiar that analysis or its conclusion, but acknowledged there would be scientific impacts. “Even with those limitations, Hubble is still doing a broad range of science observations, so I don’t personally see this as a major restriction on its ability to do important science,” he argued.

The gyro problem comes at an awkward time for NASA and Hubble. In March, NASA announced it would work to reduce the costs of operating both Hubble and the Chandra X-Ray Observatory, the other of the original “Great Observatories” space telescopes still in service. NASA cited for Chandra in particular technical problems with the aging observatory, although astronomers took issue with those claims (see “A space telescope’s cloudy future,” The Space Review, April 1, 2024.)

NASA established a committee formally called the Operations Paradigm Change Review to look at ways to reduce the operating costs of both missions, possibly by turning off instruments or other reductions in observing capabilities. Clampin, for example, said in March that Hubble’s near-infrared observing capability may no longer be valuable now that the much larger James Webb Space Telescope is operating in the same wavelengths.

The change in Hubble observations, and concomitant reduction in scientific productivity, comes as that review is nearing completion. Clampin said in the media telecon that the switch to single-gyro observations would not affect the outcome of that review.

The limitations in Hubble observations caused by the change in observing modes “are not what I would call serious impediments to continuing science operations,” he said, and thus would not affect any major conclusions of the review.

Speaking June 10 at a NASA town hall session held during a meeting of the American Astronomical Society (AAS), Clampin said NASA expected to receive a final report from the review soon. “In due course, we will make an announcement about how we plan to proceed forward,” he said, which will include a town hall with astronomers to discuss any changes to the two space telescopes.

That review included the option of shutting down either or both telescopes, although he said that was something of a last-ditch option. “We don’t want stop using Hubble and we don’t want to stop using Chandra,” he said later in the town hall. “We want to find a cheaper way to do it, but we wanted to make sure they were looking at all of the options that were possible.”

Jared Isaacman wearing an EVA spacesuit he plans to test on the upcoming Polaris Dawn mission. He has pushed for a Hubble servicing mission that could be carried out on the second Polaris program flight. (credit: SpaceX)

Reboosting or repairing Hubble

The series of problems in recent months with Gyro 3 prompted calls for a private servicing mission to Hubble. Those stemmed from a study NASA announced in September 2022 it was undertaking with SpaceX to examine how a Crew Dragon spacecraft could be used to raise Hubble’s orbit or even service it (see “NASA-SpaceX study opens final chapter for Hubble Space Telescope,” The Space Review, October 3, 2022).

That study was completed more than a year ago, but neither NASA nor SpaceX provided any details about what the study found or whether NASA would pursue any kind of commercial servicing mission. The agency also solicited other concepts for a commercial reboost mission, receiving eight responses to a request for information (RFI) early last year.

“It is not like anyone was going to wing it, especially after a joint study was assembled to determine generally how a successful mission could be achieved,” Isaacman said of a Crew Dragon servicing mission.

As NASA’s review of that study and the responses to the RFI dragged on, and Hubble went in and out of safe mode because gyro problems, one key individual became impatient. Jared Isaacman, the billionaire who led the Inspiration4 private astronaut mission in 2021 and later established the Polaris program of private missions, was involved in the NASA/SpaceX study. He envisioned it as the second of three missions Polaris planned, after a Crew Dragon mission now scheduled to launch this summer to test the ability to perform spacewalks from the spacecraft and before a crewed Starship test flight.

In a tweet in November, he said going forward with a Crew Dragon reboost and/or servicing missions “should be an easy risk/reward decision.” The benefits of a “free” (to NASA) mission included extending the life of Hubble and demonstrating commercial space capabilities, he argued. He didn’t, though, elaborate on the risks or how such a mission would work.

In May, National Public Radio reported on emails, obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request, at NASA about the study. The agency had asked experts, including former astronauts who flew on shuttle servicing missions to Hubble, to review the report. Some raised concerns about the spacewalks required to do any repairs, given that SpaceX has yet to demonstrate the ability to do spacewalks from Crew Dragon. That spacecraft also lacks a robotic arm that was essential for the shuttle servicing missions, they noted.

One of the people consulted by NASA was Keith Kalinowski, a retired Hubble operations expert, who concluded in one of the released emails that while a reboost mission might be feasible, a commercial spacewalk to repair Hubble was “unnecessary and risky.”

Isaacman weighed in on the NPR article on X, arguing again NASA was missing an opportunity not to pursue a servicing mission. “It is not like anyone was going to wing it, especially after a joint study was assembled to determine generally how a successful mission could be achieved,” he wrote.

But he also suggested that the opportunity had passed. “Had a mission been flown, and I was happy to fund it, I believe it would have resulted in the development of capabilities beneficial to the future of commercial space and along the way given Hubble a new lease on life.”

At last week’s briefing about Hubble’s switch to single-gyro operations, Clampin said that NASA would not pursue the SpaceX/Polaris servicing proposal or other commercial options, at least for now. “Our position right now is that, after exploring the current commercial capabilities, we are not going to pursue a reboost right now,” he said.

“It was not a go/no-go kind of study,” Clampin said of the NASA/SpaceX study. “There was never a recommendation to go forward.”

For NASA, the risks of a reboost or servicing mission outweighed the rewards. “Our assessment also raised a number of considerations, including potential risks such as premature loss of science and some technology challenges,” he said. “We believe we need to do some additional work to determine whether the long-term science returns will outweigh the short-term science risks.”

Clampin also offered a different characterization of the study’s conclusions, particularly about servicing. Isaacman, in his tweet last month, said that the study “arrived at a formal recommendation” on a commercial servicing mission.

“It was not a go/no-go kind of study,” Clampin said. “It was a feasibility study to help us understand some of the issues and challenges we might have to face.” He noted options for servicing Hubble, like adding new gyros installed on its exterior, were included in the study but “really just notional concepts” not explored in any serious level of technical detail.

“There was never a recommendation to go forward,” he added.

Unfortunately, neither NASA nor SpaceX have released the final report from that study, or even a summary of it, to allow people to judge these conflicting claims, even though language in the agreement suggests that such a summary is allowed. “NASA may publish unclassified and non-Proprietary Data resulting from work performed under this Agreement,” the text of the Space Act Agreement between NASA and SpaceX for this study states. “The Parties will coordinate publication of results allowing a reasonable time to review and comment.”

Clampin, in both the call with reporters and the AAS town hall meeting, left the door open to revisiting the idea of a commercial reboost or servicing mission in the future. “It was clear after doing the study that there are a lot of things we needed to think about,” he said at the town hall. “It’s not that we didn’t want to do it, but we thought it needed a lot more development work before we could proceed in what we could consider a safe way, both for the spacecraft, the telescope, and the people inside the spacecraft.”

“I don’t think there was a big disagreement amongst any of the parties involved in the study that that was needed,” he concluded.

He acknowledged, though, that some kind of mission to change Hubble’s orbit will be needed by the mid-2030s, when Hubble currently projected to deorbit. “The general feeling is that we either need to bring it in with a controlled reentry or reboost it to a higher orbit so it can continue to operate,” he said. “We have to do something then, no matter what.”

For now, though, Hubble will continue to operate—a little less efficiently, like so many of us as we age—and offer a window on the universe for astronomers, as engineers contemplate what might be possible to make it last even longer.

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Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

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Challenges To India’s Commercial Launch Business

Agnikul launched a small suborbital rocket May 30 to test technologies for a future orbital launcher. (credit: Agnikul)

Challenges for India’s emerging commercial launch industry

by Jatan Mehta
Monday, June 10, 2024

After persevering through four scrubbed launch attempts over a month, Chennai-based space startup Agnikul launched its first rocket demonstrator mission called “Suborbital Tech Demonstrator” (SOrTeD) on May 30. Unlike what many national and international media reports have implied though, and which tweets from the company or ISRO don’t actively clarify against, the single-stage SOrTeD vehicle was not intended to reach space. It was not just a suborbital mission but a squarely sub-space one, unlike competitor Skyroot’s 2022 launch of Prarambh, which achieved an apogee of 89.5 kilometers, versus the less than 10 of SOrTeD.

As can be gauged from Sibu Tripathi’s previous report, SOrTeD’s true goal was to demonstrate and learn from a controlled minute-long flight, using a minimal rocket structure powered by the in-house developed 3D-printed semi-cryogenic kerosene/liquid oxygen engine called Agnilet. The flight was successful at that goal. Having said that, the private company did not livestream the launch or share even high-level flight parameters. Based on the launch video, which came through unofficial means, the engine burnout seems to have happened about five seconds earlier than expected. Since we don’t know the differences between the achieved and intended trajectory though, including the maximum altitude SOrTeD achieved, it’s hard to gauge discrepancies.

ISRO provided the flight termination system for SOrTeD, which thankfully didn’t need to be activated. ISRO also helped the company with mission reviews, flight tracking, and enabled Agnikul to set up their private launchpad at the Sriharikota spaceport.

The turbulent trajectory ahead

Agnikul will use data from the SOrTeD mission to characterize the performance of their systems and prepare for future launches. The company raised $26.7 million last year to start working towards multiple orbital launch attempts of their customizable Agnibaan small launch vehicle. Agnibaan can loft a maximum of 300 kilograms to a 700-kilometer Earth orbit. While SOrTeD is certainly a positive step for Agnikul, a space-reaching orbital test flight will require achieving many more milestones. As such, it’s hard to see the company making an orbital attempt in 2025 as claimed.

It’s hard enough being a rocket company out of US soil; an Indian entity only faces even more hurdles.

Competitor Skyroot is further along in attempting an orbital flight of their small-lift rocket called Vikram-I. The company successfully test-fired the rocket’s second stage motor, called Kalam-250, in March. The company also recently raised $27.5 million, hoping to launch Vikram-I by end of this year. That may be difficult to achieve, but 2025 remains realistic. Other recent Vikram-I milestones include flight qualifying its Raman-I engine, which will provide roll attitude control, hot–firing the Raman-II engine powering Vikram-I’s fourth stage, and the first stage passing pressure testing.

However, the trouble is neither company has announced a confirmed payload customer for their orbital flights, citing only letters of intent and MoUs with potential customers thus far. Furthermore, both Skyroot and Agnikul also need to compete with ISRO’s own SSLV rocket, which not only has had a successful orbital demonstration already but will be moved into production via an impending industry handover. As such, my concern is that even after demonstrating successful orbital flights, Indian private rocket companies might find themselves strapped for customers in an already cutthroat market.

It’s hard enough being a rocket company out of US soil; an Indian entity only faces even more hurdles. While the Indian government has opened up approval-less foreign direct investments (FDI) for the country’s private space sector, launch vehicle companies are only allowed to freely seek up to 49% in FDI. This is likely for national security reasons but does hamper an Indian rocket startup’s ability to scale. With the nature of the competition laid out above, and without a high launch cadence, it will be an uphill battle for these companies to survive and be profitable this decade—unless they pivot to serving the country’s strategic needs.

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A version of this article was published by the author in his Indian Space Progress newsletter.

Jatan Mehta is a science writer passionate about space exploration and the Moon. His portfolio can be found at jatan.space.

Prospects For Orbital Data Centers

A terrestrial data center. The business case for orbital data centers might close witha modest reduction in launch costs. (credit: KKR)

by Lawrence Furnival
Monday, June 10, 2024

In the near future, orbital data centers could prove to be an important new revenue stream for launch providers and cloud services. As this article describes, if the price of a Falcon 9 was $20 million instead of $67 million, it would make sense to operate data centers in orbit with their current cost and weight. This goal could be moved significantly closer if space optimized data center systems were available—primarily shielding and cooling systems. Moreover, near-future launch costs per kilogram to low Earth orbit for SpaceX’s next rocket are thought to be about 10% of that of the current Falcon 9.

Use cases

Moving large quantities of data is both costly and time consuming, thus the truism that big data needs to be near its compute. Amazon Web Services asks customers moving really big data up to their compute services to use a compact array of hard drives, called SnowBall, and a truck. Why? Because for big data, a truck of hard drives is faster than squeezing through the straw of the Internet.

Moving large quantities of data is both costly and time consuming, thus the truism that big data needs to be near its compute.

And in orbit, big data is growing. Earth observation satellites are moving to high-resolution synthetic aperture radar and multispectral imaging. Space telescopes are in an exciting phase of discovery and generating several orders of magnitude more data. Some satellite constellations are moving to free space laser communications, which gives a tremendous bandwidth boost, but because the free space optical link cannot tolerate clouds, the required Earth-based radio gateways remain a significant bottleneck. I have been told that up to 60% of revenue generated by Planet, which operates a constellation of imaging satellites, goes to third-party ground stations. I am a small Planet stockholder and, if this is true, I can now understand why Planet’s stock price is struggling. Processing data in orbit would help.

National security workloads can be very time sensitive and, for such applications, the need for orbital processing is even more critical. One can imagine a security analyst asking an orbital AI about recent troop movements and getting an immediate answer rather than facing a delay as data downloads to a gateway and then to a terrestrial data center.

Opportunities

Artificial intelligence has a power bottleneck. Mark Zuckerberg recently decried power as an important limit for AI development. AI analysts suggest that finding a data center with sufficient power is more difficult than sourcing hard-to-find Nvidia GPUs. High-capacity terrestrial power plants have long lead times. Zuckerberg estimates making new power plants generating hundreds of megawatts will take at least five years in the current regulatory environment. Further, he emphasized the current need is for data centers with gigawatt power.

These long lead times for high-capacity terrestrial power plants means alternative power sources are needed for these gigawatt demands. Solar power in orbit is cheap, continuous, and without regulation.

I estimate that nuclear power has too much uncertainty due to costs of regulation and decommissioning, and politics. If people resist nuclear power in their backyards, they will doubly resist nuclear power largely for AI in their backyards.

It is more useful to compare terrestrial solar installations to orbital ones. Solar farms are well documented. A 150-megawatt solar farm, which would require 150 acres and with a life span of 25 years, can be built for $221 million, annualized at $8.8 million/year.

A solar panel in orbit receives 1.4 megawatts per square meter. The best space-grade solar panels (Rocket Lab IMM-β, for instance) can harvest a third of that. At a beta angle of 90 degrees, the orbit allows sunlight 100% of the orbit. So 150 megawatts can be provided by a panel of 10 by 30 meters, instead of 150 acres. The solar cells are remarkably light at 49 milligrams per square centimeter, so for the cells themselves, the weight would be 300 kilograms. If the infrastructure and structure is required to support them is roughly four times the weight of the cells themselves, then the power infrastructure would weigh 1,200 kilograms or $3.2 million in lift expense to LEO by Falcon 9. The lifetime would be million years so annualized at $640K/year for the cost of launch. So the cost of power, to the closest million, is close to the cost of the panels themselves.

The power density of the Sun in orbit, sunlight 24 hours a day, and the light weight and efficiency of space grade solar cells makes this option very attractive. This attractive power density has led to many proposals for beaming orbital-generated power to Earth. This doesn’t make sense. But using it in orbit does.

There are other factors that support orbital data centers:

Intersatellite laser communications: Quantum key distribution cannot be done at distance by optical fiber as the internal reflections of the fiber tunnel make it difficult to distinguish the resulting quantum states. Line-of-sight free laser communications between satellites are perfect from a distribution and security point of view. This makes it relatively easy to functionally aggregate smaller orbital data centers together, where physically larger data centers may be too heavy.

This use case could become a driver in space technology capabilities, an important new revenue stream for launch providers, and provide considerable benefits to global compute users.

Space laser communications are focused and narrow, so they are protected from jamming and interception. Mesh communications enable all the participating satellites to transmit through one another to reach a data center or a ground station instead of directly down. Because low Earth orbits satellites have an orbit of about 100 minutes, they have between two and four minutes to transmit their data to a given ground station gateway as they pass. Thus, space free laser mesh communications will lead to an explosion of data as the bottleneck between the satellites disappears.

Global connectivity: For global disaster response, especially if mediated by an AI, providing critical infrastructure for communication and analysis during disaster would be a benefit. Given future global remote education mediated by AI is likely, there is a case to be made for placing that data center in orbit as well. Disaster recovery and backup use cases might benefit as well.

Radio spectrum limits: Keeping data in orbit is increasingly important as the ability to grow the capacity of radiofrequency ground station gateways has significant limits. There is a limit to available spectrum, and a limit to the number of locations of cooperative politically stable countries to allot that spectrum, which has to be paid for (and whose spectrum would be free of potential jamming from a neighbor.)

Challenges

A data center on Earth, in rule-of-thumb terms, costs $7 million to $12 million per megawatt of commissioned IT load. So, a 150-megawatt IT load would be between $1 billion and $1.8 billion.

How big of a data center could you fit in one Falcon 9 LEO launch at $67 million? One could load 16 racks of the latest from Nvidia: two 8x rack SuperPOD for Nvidia DGX GB200 NVL72, giving you 23 exaflops of FP4 computing. The power consumption would be two megawatts for the 576 CPU, 1152 GPU, with 480TB of memory. According to Nvidia, two of these racks can support a 54-trillion parameter model. (GPT-4 is said to be a 1.7-trillion parameter model.) Add $4 million for the satellite and solar array, and ground station access.

Assuming compute hardware costs (the cost of the CPU and GPU) are similar in the two cases, the same two megawatts of IT load on Earth would cost in the $20 million range plus $2 million for a solar farm ($1 million/megawatt) so, to the closest million plus, the CPU/GPU required is $22 million. That is roughly 30% of current orbital costs of $71 million (both excluding the cost of the Nvidia SuperPOD.)

Conclusions

This use case could become a driver in space technology capabilities, an important new revenue stream for launch providers, and provide considerable benefits to global compute users. And AI development, national security, and Earth observation seem to have the most immediate critical needs.

Terrestrial high-performance compute is heavy, primarily because of liquid thermal control systems. These need to be optimized. A continued reduction in space launch costs, coupled with advances in lightweight power and thermal management solutions, will be the key factors to watch in making orbital data centers practical.

Thanks to Amir Akbari, Naveed Husain, and David Downie for reading drafts of this essay.

Thanks To The Succesful Flight Of Star Ship IV, We Are On The Cusp Of A Transportation Revolution

The launch of Space X’s Star Ship IV was a rousing success. When the first stage ignited, 32 of the 33 engines fired. Engine number 33 on the outer ring failed to ignite. The other 32 engines were “throttled up” and overcame this power deficiency. The first stage separated smoothly. As it fell back to earth, the 6 gimballed engines in the inner ring fired and slowed down the booster for a smooth landing in the Gulf of Mexico. This means the booster can be recovered in subsequent flights making the rocket economically viable.

    Starship’s 6 engines fired. It went into a sub-orbital arc that took it over the Indian Ocean. On the last flight, Star Ship broke up and disintegrated on reentry. This time it survived reentry, even after losing one fin used for maneuvering. Its excellent cameras recorded the entire reentry. The six rocket motors fired again. Star Ship was slowed for a smooth landing in the Indian Ocean.

    A few of my readers are die-hard space enthusiasts (me included). For us, this is a joyous happening. The rest of our readers wonder, “What does this matter to me?” I was in the pool with one of our readers. I pointed out to her that as a result of Star Ship, we are on the cusp of a transportation revolution here on Earth.

    Please fast forward roughly 12 years. Very large urban airports around the world will evolve into airports/spaceports. Those of us who travel internationally know all too well the pain of very long airplane flights including jet lag, loss of sleep, dry skin, blood circulation problems, etc. I suspect that over the last 57 years, I have accumulated several thousand hours flying in jets. My longest plane flight came in September of 1981 when I flew 20 hours from Rome to Sydney, Australia. Elena experienced a similar time in the air from Argentina to Europe.

   The Star Ship revolution will change all this. Let us assume that you are flying from Los Angeles to Rio de Janeiro, Seattle to Shanghai, San Francisco to Buenos Aires, etc. When you go to the international terminal for your flight, you will not board an aircraft. You will board a Star Ship. The Star Ship will blast off. You will have a gentle ride up to the stratosphere. You will spend more than an hour flying through space. You will get some incredible views. You will experience weightlessness. Your Star Ship will then reenter the earth’s atmosphere. Some two hours after lift-off, you will land at your faraway destination that once required 14-16 hours of travel in pressurized tin cans. You will spend far more time in security, passport control, customs, and immigration than in travel time.

   An exciting new world is just around the corner.

Will The Starliner Ever Fly?

Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner atop its Atlas 5 rocket before a May 6 launch attempt. NASA astronaut Suni Williams is at right, in the tower near the crew access arm. (credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky)

Star-crossed liner

by Jeff Foust
Monday, June 3, 2024

Sometime in the near future—perhaps as soon as Wednesday morning—an Atlas 5 will finally lift off from Cape Canaveral, carrying Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner with NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams on board. If all goes as planned, that spacecraft will arrive at the International Space Station about a day after launch, docking to the station and staying for around a week. Then Starliner will depart and, several hours later, reenter to land in the southwestern United States, wrapping up the final major test before NASA certifies the spacecraft for ISS crew rotation missions.

It’s just taking Boeing, NASA, and United Launch Alliance a long time to get to that point.

“We’ve done everything that we can to make sure that we’re not missing things,” said NASA’s Stich in March.

The trials and tribulations of Starliner have been clear for years, but earlier this spring both Boeing and NASA said they had put those problems—such as faulty software, corroded valves, flammable tape wiring, and inadequate parachute components—behind them. Starliner was finally ready for the Crew Flight Test (CFT) mission, a test flight to show that the spacecraft can safely transport astronauts to and from the station.

Both the agency and company believed those problems were behind the program. “We have very robust processes,” said Mark Nappi, the Boeing vice president who is program manager for commercial crew at the company, at a briefing in March. “The proof of that is that the problems that we have caught in the past have been caught as part of that process—albeit they have been caught late.” He cited as proof of that the “exceptionally successful” second uncrewed test flight of Starliner in May 2022.

“We’ve done everything that we can to make sure that we’re not missing things,” said Steve Stich, NASA commercial crew program manager, at that same briefing.

But when they proceeded with a launch attempt for the CFT mission May 6, what tripped them up was not the spacecraft but the rocket. Two hours before liftoff, with Wilmore and Williams in the process of boarding Starliner, managers scrubbed the launch: an oxygen relief valve in the rocket’s Centaur upper stage was oscillating, vibrating at 40 hertz.

Resetting the valve would solve the problem, which had been seen a few times in past Atlas launches, but doing so would violate flight rules put into place for CFT, the first crewed Atlas 5 launch, that prohibit changes to the state of the Centaur once loaded with propellants and with a crew on the spacecraft.

Immediately after the scrub, ULA CEO Tory Bruno left open the option of trying again as soon as the next night. “We could be ready tomorrow if we find out we have plenty of life” in the valve, he said at a briefing a couple hours after the scrub. However, ULA ultimately decided to replace the valve, which involved rolling the rocket back to its hangar.

Boeing vice president and commercial crew program manager Mark Nappi after the May 6 scrub. (credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky)

In that process, though, Boeing found a helium leak with a thruster on Starliner’s service module. That led to a schedule dance of sorts lasting a couple weeks: NASA would announce it was pushing back the launch several days to further study the leak, only to announce a few days later another delay, without providing details on what was going on with the leak or anything else that might be causing the delay.

“This is really not a safety-of-flight issue for ourselves, and we believe that we have a well-understood condition that we can manage,” Nappi said of the helium leak.

Finally, on May 24—the Friday before Memorial Day weekend—NASA held a briefing on what was holding up Starliner, now that the faulty Centaur valve was replaced. “We are learning more about the system every day,” Jim Free, NASA associate administrator, said at the start of the briefing, describing how NASA and Boeing sought the “right balance” of updates what that was ongoing.

The 90-minute briefing started with the helium leak. Engineers concluded the leak was a flaw in a single seal: a rubber ring the diameter of a shirt button and the thickness of ten sheets of paper. A defect in the seal caused the leak, first noticed immediately after the May 6 scrub, to grow worse as it was tested.

Boeing and NASA concluded that Starliner could fly as-is: the leak was not a major risk, and replacing the seal would have required extensive repair work. “If we were to remove the seal completely,” Nappi said, “the leak rate would not exceed our capability to manage that leak. That made us comfortable that, if this leak were to get worse, it would be acceptable to fly.”

Other work conclude that the damaged seal was not a systemic problem, with no evidence of problems with any other seals in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. “This is really not a safety-of-flight issue for ourselves, and we believe that we have a well-understood condition that we can manage,” Nappi concluded.

So far, so good. NASA’s Stich said at the briefing that engineers used this time to perform other reviews of the propulsion system, a step he said was intended to “make sure we didn’t have any other things that we should be concerned about.”

As it turned out, there was something to be concerned about. The review turned up what he called a “design vulnerability” with Starliner’s propulsion system that had not been recognized. Starliner’s service module has four areas called “doghouses” spaced 90 degrees apart that host both larger Orbital Maneuvering and Attitude Control (OMAC) thrusters and smaller reaction control system (RCS) thrusters. If two adjacent doghouses failed for some reason, though, it would prevent the spacecraft from doing a deorbit burn even though the spacecraft is designed with multiple ways to carry out the deorbit burn using combinations of OMAC and RCS thrusters.

“It’s a pretty diabolical case,” Stich said of that scenario, which he and Nappi emphasized was rare, occurring in less than one percent of the potential combinations of failures in the propulsion system. “You would lose two helium manifolds in two separate doghouses, and they have to be next to each other.”

NASA and Boeing developed another approach to doing the deorbit burn using four RCS thrusters, splitting the deorbit maneuver into two separate burns. But the late discovery of this design vulnerability prompted questions about why it was found only now, after years of development and scrutiny—particularly since it came two months after the agency and the company made the case their reviews had not missed anything.

“The helium leak itself caused us to look a little more in detail in the manifolds and how the thrusters were architected off of each of those manifolds,” Stich said, which revealed the vulnerability. “It just took us a little time to figure this out now. The question is, should we have seen this earlier? Maybe in a perfect timeframe we might have identified this earlier.”

With the helium leak no longer a concern and the design vulnerability identified and temporarily corrected—Nappi said Boeing was looking at several permanent fixes to the problem, using some combination of hardware changes and software modifications, for later Starliner missions—it was time to try to launch Starliner again, this time on June 1.

Astronauts Suni Williams and Butch Wilmore greet well-wishers before boarding a van to the launch pad for the June 1 launch attempt. (credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky)

The countdown was going well other than an issue about two hours before liftoff with the Centaur, this time with valves used for replenishing or “topping” the vehicle with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. The problem was initially linked to malfunctioning sensors, which controllers corrected by switching to another set, allowing the valves to resume operations. Launch preparations continued into the final minutes.

Then, seconds after the rocket exited its pre-planned T-4 minute hold, a call of “Hold! Hold! Hold!” was heard. A rocket issue of some kind halted the countdown and, with an instantaneous launch window, scrubbed that day’s launch attempt.

“It’s human to be a little disappointed,” Stich said. “Everyone’s a little disappointed, but you roll your sleeves up and get back to work.”

The problem, ULA’s Bruno said at a later briefing, was with one of three redundant ground control computers, housed in racks that hold cards responsible for various tasks. A card known as the launch sequencer came up slower in one computer than in the other two, a discrepancy that “tripped a red line” and caused the hold, he said.

Another card in the same computer was responsible for the topping valve issue seen earlier in the countdown, he said. Those cards have been reliable, he said, although “it’s not unheard of to replace a card.” They were tested in the preparations leading up to the launch and were working well, he said.

At the time of the briefing, Bruno said it might be possible to replace a faulty card or cards in time for a launch attempt the next day, but a couple hours later NASA said they would skip that launch opportunity to provide ULA with more time to resolve the problem. NASA said late June 2 that ULA found a problem with a power supply for part of that computer rack. ULA replaced and retested that rack, allowing a launch attempt June 5, the next available opportunity.

Ironically, for all its problems in the past, Starliner was in good shape during the launch attempt, with only a brief issue with power to fans that circulate air in the pressure suits worn by the astronauts. The helium leak not only hadn’t gotten worse but instead had actually decreased.

Officials acknowledged the delays were frustrating but that they and others working on Starliner remained focused. “It’s human to be a little disappointed,” Stich said. “Everyone’s a little disappointed, but you roll your sleeves up and get back to work.”

“When you’re playing a game and you get a bad call, you’re a little irritated at first, a little frustrated at first,” Nappi said, “but you need to focus on the next pitch.”

That next pitch is scheduled to come Wednesday, with NASA confirming late Monday that the launch remained on track and that weather remained favorable (remarkably weather has not been an issue for the previous Starliner launch attempts in recent weeks.) There is another opportunity Thursday but, after that, ULA said it may need to replace batteries on the Atlas 5, work that would take about 10 days, pushing the next launch to the second half of June.

NASA says it remains committed to Starliner, seeking “dissimilar redundancy” that two different vehicles launched on two different rockets provide for accessing the ISS. NASA had hoped to start flying astronauts to the station on Starliner early next year, a mission designated Starliner-1, alternating missions with SpaceX’s Crew Dragon, but it’s not clear now if the certification work can be completed in time to support that schedule.

“That will be something that we will work on after the flight,” Stich said of certification before the June 1 launch. “The path to Starliner-1 clearly is through Crew Flight Test. That is the most important thing we have towards certification.”

“The longer it takes to fly CFT, the shorter that period becomes for us to review that data” from the flight, Nappi said. “Getting the certification review done as soon as we can is important regardless of when we fly.”

What is perhaps most remarkable about the situation is how much things have changed in the last decade. Boeing seemed the obvious choice at the time for one commercial crew award, and may well have been the leading candidate if NASA decided to make only one. The company, after all, had decades of experience in human spaceflight. Moreover, it was working with ULA, which at the time handled nearly all major US government launches. What could possibly go wrong?

Today, Starliner is now at least four years behind SpaceX’s Crew Dragon, which launched on its successful crewed test flight in May 2020. The Starliner launch is set to be ULA’s third launch of 2024, after the debut of Vulcan and retirement of the Delta IV Heavy; SpaceX launched 14 Falcon 9 rockets in May alone.

A successful test flight launching this week won’t fix all those problems, but could at least get the program moving in the right direction so it doesn’t lose any more ground.

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Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

Power Politics Transcends Space Security

The UN Security deadlocked in a May 20 debate on a Russian resolution to ban weapons in space, weeks after Russia vetoed a resolution regarding nuclear weapons in space. (credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías)

by Ajey Lele
Monday, June 3, 2024

For some years now the mockery of space security has been on display at various international forums, particularly at the United Nations (UN). Recently, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted against a resolution presented by Russia and China that would ban member states from placing weapons of any kind in outer space. Before this, the US-Japan resolution specifically to ban the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was vetoed in the UNSC by Russia.

Today, space security is being held hostage to the policies of mainly the US on one hand and Russia and China on the other.

Interestingly, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) was successful in adopting a resolution in support of the destructive DA-ASAT (direct accent anti-satellite) testing moratorium in December 2022. There was a very good support to this mechanism with 155 states voting in favor while nine voted against and nine abstained. The sizable number of states voting in favor broadly indicates that there is a global acceptance to the idea that space weaponization should be a “no-go.” However two prominent states that voted against this resolution are Russia and China.

On February 12, 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) in its plenary session. Subsequently, on June 10, 2014, Russia and China submitted a second draft of this treaty to the CD. However, the US (and perhaps some of its allies) are not in favor of any discussion on this mechanism.

All in all, there are major differences among the UNSC Security Council’s five permanent members, aka the P5. Today’s P5 is “P3 plus P2”, with the US, UK, and France on one side and China and Russia on the other. Since these two power blocks (with veto power) are at loggerheads with each other at geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic levels, it is highly unlikely that they would be able to find common ground when it comes to aspects of space security, at least in near future.

Against this it could be said with certitude that, today, space security is being held hostage to the policies of mainly the US on one hand and Russia and China on the other. It is not the purpose of this article to debate on who is right and who is wrong, but to say simplistically that the rest of the world is becoming a victim to their differences when it comes to space security.

It should be mentioned that there are other issues regarding space security, such as the policies of states like North Korea and Iran. Also, Pakistan and China may have their own views about the conduct of the 2019 ASAT test by India. On October 31, 2023, an Israeli Arrow-2 missile defense system intercepted a missile launched by Hothi rebels from Yemen. This interception happened outside the atmosphere at an altitude of approximately 100 kilometers. This could be considered the first instance of any form space combat.

All this indicates that the challenges to space security are not going to emerge only from the counterspace programs of the states like the US, Russia, and China. However, if these states, which are P5 members, remain at loggerheads, then no positive movement towards starting a constructive debate on space security can ever happen.

Structures like the Group of Governmental Experts (GGA) and Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors are good initiatives for constructive engagements. However, the basic assumption behind these mechanisms is that they let us look for low-hanging fruit. Since establishing a space regime with a legally binding mechanism is not achievable, they help us look for a soft law option. But even soft options are not working. In the recent past, a sincere approach like International Space Code of Conduct did not work.

Broadly, no agreement (soft law or hard law) towards establishing any trustworthy space security architecture is possible in at least the near future. On the other hand, challenges to space security are increasing and hence there is a need to push for the establishment of a space security regime. Following are examples to highlight why there should be an urgency to address the issues of space security.

Recently, the US has claimed that Russia had launched a “weapon” capable of attacking other satellites in space. According to the experts, the launch of Cosmos 2576 on May 16 amounts to launching a space weapon. This could be an inspector satellite in low Earth orbit and appears to be currently trailing a US spy satellite. There is a possibility that Russia is testing co-orbital ASAT technology. Also, there were claims that Russia is developing an ASAT nuclear weapon. Obviously, the Kremlin has refuted the claims of the US officials, but in the recent past, the Kremlin also denied that Russia would ever invade Ukraine!

The need of the hour is to have a universally acceptable, verifiable, and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument for space security. This topic is too important to be left to the Americans, Russians, and Chinese.

Going to space is a costly affair and developing technologies in government laboratories costs more than in the private sector. For many years, the private sector has been directly or indirectly linked with the space programs of various states. At present, the private sector is increasingly associated towards advancing the global space agenda. In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, the role played by private space sector towards assisting Ukraine is well known. It was reported that during September 2022, Ukrainian forces had planned an attack on the Russian naval fleet based at Sevastopol in Crimea. The Ukrainian forces had asked for assistance from the Starlink network. However, since Elon Musk was not keen to expand the war towards Crimea, he refused any assistance. According to him, he had a discussion with the Russian ambassador to the US and was cautioned that any acceleration of the war on Crimea would lead to a nuclear response. Hence, he decided to avoid any possible entry of nuclear weapons into the conflict. This could possibly be the first case in history when a private individual has taken a decision on aspects of a potential nuclear conflict!

Mainly owing to technology disruption, the expanse of space security is increasing. Moreover, the presence of private players is going to create a paradoxical situation for space security. Russia has already claimed that in the future commercial satellites could become valid targets for their counterspace capabilities. The question is how much this piecemeal approach (say, a ban on DA-ASAT) for securing space would eventually be beneficial?

What is important today is to holistically address the issue of space security and identify a comprehensive approach to address the issues related to space security. There is a criticism that major space powers first test technologies to their full satisfaction and then subsequently introduce mechanisms to prevent other states from developing such technologies. Thus, there could be concerns that any internationally agreed mechanism for space security could impede the effectiveness of existing missile defense systems.

The challenges associated with space debris are well-known. In general, the probability of debris impacting active space systems could be more for countries and agencies that have more active satellites. In the last few years, the dependence of humanity on space for conduct of various activities has accelerated. The US, Russia, and China cannot hold the world hostage just to secure their own interests in space. The need of the hour is to have a universally acceptable, verifiable, and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument for space security. This topic is too important to be left to the Americans, Russians, and Chinese.

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Ajey Lele is Deputy Director General at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India and the views expressed are personal.

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Space Resources 2024: In Search Of A Great Bargain

Harvesting resources from the Moon or other bodies raises questions about how those activities can and should be governed. (credit: ESA)

Space Resources 2024: In search of the Grand Bargain

by Dennis O’Brien
Monday, June 3, 2024

The United Nations sponsored two meetings of space resource experts this spring, one in Luxembourg in March and the other in Vienna in April. The meetings were part of public outreach by the new Working Group on the Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activity (Working Group), created by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The experts were selected by the member states of COPUOS. Although there was a wide spectrum of opinion on many topics, the possibility of an agreement still seems within reach, a grand bargain that will support the private sector while protecting essential public policies.

The Working Group was formed in 2022 and given a five-year mandate, including the development of possible “additional international governance instruments.” It set five topics to be discussed at the Expert Meetings:

• Implications of the legal framework for space resource activities (SRA);
• Role of governance, including information-sharing, in supporting SRA;
• The scope of future SRA;
• Environmental and socioeconomic aspects of SRA;
• International cooperation in scientific research and technological development of SRA.

The first two were the focus of the sessions in Vienna and the last three in Luxembourg. However, there was much overlap. Rather than summarizing the views of each expert as presented, this report will instead paraphrase and group them by relevant topics, describing the diverse spectrum of interests, highlighting new ideas and approaches, and suggesting a potential agreement that would address the concerns of all.

1. Overall policy considerations

These are complicated times (global tensions, Ukraine). Outer space offers an opportunity to collaborate beyond our divisions. Resource cooperation can bring us together. International cooperation is a priority, based on our shared values and common interests. We must develop ethics that promote peace, safety, and sustainability.

Space resources activities have a global impact, are not confined to a single nation. They must be peaceful, benefit all, and improve human well-being. The issues are complex, interdisciplinary, and interlinked, but ultimately such activities must be responsible, sustainable, and equitable.

Although building on our common interests is important, some also spoke of the need to address our competing interests: Must protect interests. Balance competing interests. Balancing interests—the key to opening the lock.

2. Current status of space resources governance

There was consensus that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST) is the foundation of current international space governance, a binding agreement that has been adopted by all countries active in outer space. The articles mentioned most: Art. I (free access, nondiscrimination, benefit/interests of all countries, compliance with international law); Art. II (nonappropriation); Art. VI (compliance by nationals, including private); Art. IX (due regard, avoid harmful interference and contamination); Art. XI (share information).

The Outer Space Treaty incorporates related principles of international law. It supports science but is silent or vague concerning space resource activities. There is an absence of a legal framework for resources. OST Art. VI requires compliance in all national activities, public or private; national obligations are private obligations. OST Art. IX: due regard, respect interests of all member states, regime of consultation. There is good language in the Moon Agreement (MA), especially Article 4 (benefit all, due regard for “interests of present and future generations”)

But there were differing opinions about the inherent nature of outer space:

Outer space is a global commons. Outer space is not a commons. Outer space is a common-pool resource. Outer space is an area beyond national jurisdiction, as used in Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Treaty [aka BBNJ Treaty, aka High Seas Treaty]. The “Common Heritage of Mankind” is a political term and does not have a fixed legal definition.

Regional agreements are valid, helpful (e.g., Artemis Accords). National laws are part of the legal framework: Luxembourg in 2016 (a small country). Japan’s Space Resources Act of 2021 requires license and publication of activities (e.g., ispace). [Also USA 2015, UAE 2023] [There is a difference of opinion on the extension of national laws beyond a country’s jurisdiction.]

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is already providing governance of space resources (orbital slots and frequencies). ITU is a specific, successful legal regime, and thus a possible model. It promotes rational, economic, efficient, equitable utilization. Art. 42 protects equitable access and preserves resources for future use. [Note: the ITU is now considering expanding its governance to the Moon and cislunar space.]

3. The scope of future space resource activity/governance and process

What is a space resource? Anything that can bring benefit to others. Minerials/materials (including regolith, water), locations/territory (including “peaks of eternal sunlight”). Orbital resources such as slots and frequencies. Earth observations (imaging/data) are a resource, especially for developing countries.

Distinguish between types of resource mining, e.g., in situ resource utilization (ISRU) (e.g., materials used for base building and exploration) versus “reserve” mining for sale on Earth and other locations. Different governance is needed for different types of resource activity. Asteroid mining is likely reserve mining.

COPUOS process essential for creating new framework. Use COPUOS Space Resources Working Group. Different rules for different phases? Similar process to Moon Agreement Art. 11. OST Art. IX consultation process? Call to action: start drafting immediately. [Note: The Moon Agreement calls for review of resource governance every 10 years.]

4. Science and technology; sharing information

The greatest crossover of expert opinions occurred between the topics of information sharing and scientific and technological cooperation. The general opinion seemed to be that scientific discoveries, including new resources, should be shared freely, even by the private sector. Conversely, there was general acknowledgement that intellectual property, including patented technologies, needed to be protected, even as processes were developed to share essential technology with emerging countries.

Sharing information is a form of benefit sharing. Science transcends resource utilization; it increases knowledge of the universe and overall economic activity, and is good for all. Sharing information is essential, promotes transparency, inclusion, confidence building, coordination, capacity building, safety, peace, conflict avoidance, sustainability. Transparency and inclusivity maximize benefits. A range of info could be shared, including scientific data and research; resources are scientific.

OST Art. XI: share the nature, conduct, locations, and results of outer space activities. Registration Convention. International Lunar Research Station policy: share science and technology. Robust governance for info sharing, open data plan, crucial/ethical for SRA. Distinguish between scientific and commercial information. Scientific data in public domain, versus purely commercial. Share scientific knowledge; open source; genetic info and resources. Prospecting/discovery of resources, especially minerals, is scientific; sharing info is a win/win. Sharing info affects capabilities; the stakes are high. Responsibility and sustainability require strong governance and info sharing. Share data on resource locations, and techniques to avoid duplication.

Intellectual Property: OST Art. XI is not absolute: must balance needs/interests of investors. Technology is key. Free versus sale of info. This is still a new endeavor; what info is useful at what time? What is feasible now? There is a need for discretion.

Info sharing applies to private actors. How to encourage the private sector to share info? Registration, interoperability, standardization. Address intellectual property (IP) concerns using national law. [e.g., compensation for a government taking] Partnership with emerging countries. Promote operational cooperation, info exchange; ICGNSS model. [Note: COPUOS is now considering creation of an Action Team on Lunar Activity Coordination (ATLAC), a precursor to an ongoing mechanism for such coordination, which would include private sector participation.] Knowledge increases certainty. The private sector needs to exchange knowledge to be successful. Trade for guarantees/priorities?

5. Social and environmental aspects; sharing benefits

There was consensus on the sentiment expressed in the first paragraph of OST Art. I: “The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.” But opinions differed on its interpretation.

OST Art. I was cited repeatedly. Benefit all mankind: resolve divergence, remove obstacles, int’l cooperation, help developing countries. Small countries are important for inclusion, info sharing, accessibility, free exploration, peaceful use. Many small, emerging, and developing countries are already doing space science/collaboration, but positions are unequal. Not all countries have technology and investment capital to access. They need equitable access to resources, technology, information, and capacity building. Space law for new space actors. Equitable access to resources and technology is part of benefit sharing, but what is the best way?

Tension exists between benefit sharing and market practices. Doesn’t have to benefit every country. OST Art. I applies to “activity”, not space itself, therefore no authority for royalties on resources. Monetary sharing of benefits: decouple from resources themselves, focus on market and profits[see reserve mining, above], process for distribution should use sliding scale, help those most in need (e.g., capacity building). The Hague Group Building Blocks (section on Benefit Sharing) seeks balance: share benefits, but no mandatory monetary contributions.

Sustainability (multi-faceted) is the test for all space resource activity. New catalogue of principles based on sustainability. Conformity with existing laws. Identify sustainability in current/additional agreements. Assess every level, every function.

OST Art. IX: no harmful contamination. MA Art. 7: prevent the disruption of the existing balance of environment. Protect the pristine. COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy. Avoid space debris (interferes with goals): reduce, reuse, recycle. Manage, protect. Precautionary mitigation, remediation. Require environmental impact assessments for all space resource activity.

6. Overall governance

There was a spectrum of options presented for future governance, from binding treaties to non-binding guidelines and best practices. There was general agreement that national governments enforce international obligations, including private sector responsibilities.

Governance must assure accountability, responsibility, and accessibility. It must promote economic, ecological, and social justice. It must resolve attribution of rights, sharing of benefits. It must balance public and private concerns. Coordination and cooperation (public and private) are essential, whether binding or nonbinding. Must engage with NGOs. Must honor OST Art. IX, due regard for interests of all countries.

Consider the International Telecommunication Union and the Moon Agreement as models; both promote economic efficiency and equitable utilization of resources. The spirit of MA is still alive.

7. Management and regulation of space resource activity

There was general agreement that supporting the private sector is good public policy. The private sector provides resources, talent, creativity, and enthusiasm that are necessary for a sustainable human presence in outer space.

Encourage and enable utilization and exploitation by those who can. There is a need for an enabling framework for private success: regulations, technology, financing. Moon Agreement section 11.7 is not suitable. Hague Building Blocks: priority rights, advance notice of activities, develop best practices. Set aside 80% of Moon’s resources for private utilization, 20% for public. Understand before regulating. Demonstration projects. Focus on polar resources.

But most also spoke of the need for regulation to protect and promote other essential public policies, such as sustainability and nonappropriation.

Regulation and a legal framework is necessary for economic sustainability; learn from Earth’s economy. Need a framework that not only produces profit but also benefits all; can’t just be economic values and models. An international agency is needed for licenses, compliance, dispute resolution, and environmental monitoring.

Mining equals appropriation. “Safety zones” are de facto appropriation and give priority to whoever gets there first. Safety zones must be subject to international review; their deconfliction function is not obvious. Legal title needed for resource marketability, but who has jurisdiction to grant it? Need to clarify ownership, registration, environmental protection. National space resources acts must be lawful and their implementation must be reasonable.

Several speakers observed that regulation could be different for different types of resources and situations.

Distinguish between utilization for ISRU/exploration and “reserve” mining, with exports to Earth and other locations, and marketing. Reserve mining would be subject to fees, taxation, or royalties; no free dinner. Asteroids are not near-term resources, and must be careful redirecting them. Sudden influx or dumping of precious metals would be harmful to the world economy.

Many speakers noted that the free market economy for space resource activity is already being created on Earth with the development of auxiliary services and supporting technology.

New opportunities, economic opportunities. They will accelerate if done right. Create markets on Earth. Stimulate demand and create customers. Provide services: research and development, sales. Develop technology systems. Technology produces profit, which produces a market economy. Moon services: power, landing pads. Space solar power, sunscreens (energy shortage on Earth). Develop technology for interplanetary, interstellar navigation.

8. New international space resource agreement: pros and cons

A “robust” legal framework is needed for sustainability. An incremental approach is not enough, but instead need predictive governance. International predictive governance is needed for investors. Legal certainty promotes marketability and title. We have principles, but now need predictive rules. Interpretations varied: need all nations to agree. It reduces the risk of conflict and maintains peace and security. National legislation complicates and could harm developing countries: no first-come, first-served. Fly together and go farther.

Don’t be too ambitious. Any new regulation should be narrowly tailored, not predictive. We still don’t know what space resource activity will be. Not ready for new regulation. No need to change prior agreements. Reform existing treaties and include all nations and sectors in the process. Gradual movement: Building Blocks, GEGSLA, ESRIC. Use OST Art. IX to address situations as they arise. It is easier to prohibit bad behavior and prevent harm. National laws and bilateral and regional agreements (e.g. Artemis Accords) are OK if compatible with international law.

Conclusion: the Grand Bargain

The process currently underway at COPUOS is effectively an Article IX consultation under the Outer Space Treaty. It is based on concerns that “an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space… would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.” There is no need for a new treaty; rather, the States Parties can adopt an Article IX “consultation agreement” that would address the gaps in the OST concerning space resource activity.

Although the market for space resource activity has not yet matured, it is sufficiently foreseeable to allow such an agreement, one with the flexibility to develop standards and recommended practices as circumstances evolve by creating an ongoing mechanism or process that will engage with all stakeholders, including the private sector.

It is not enough to build a framework based on our common interests; we must build one that also addresses our competing interests. We can do that through a Grand Bargain, a legal framework based on a consultation agreement that supports private space resource activity in return for protecting essential public policies. The Space Treaty Project has been promoting a Model Resource Agreement for years. Here is the latest version, modified to consider the ideas and issues raised at the UN-COPUOS international expert conferences:

Model Consultation Agreement, Outer Space Treaty Article IX

1. The States Parties agree to create, by separate agreement, an Agency for Lunar [Outer Space] Activity Coordination (“Agency”), an administrative agency within the secretariat of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Activities.

2. All cislunar [outer space] activities, including space resource activities, shall be registered with the Agency by the country authorizing/supervising the activity, including activities by its nationals.

3. Outer space resources shall include materials, locations, and nonmaterial assets such as radio frequencies.

4. Any materials removed from in place shall become the property of the entity removing them, subject to the entity’s own national laws.

5. All space resource activities shall require an environmental impact assessment that is filed with the Agency prior to commencement of the activity.

6. Access to outer space resources shall be shared. Space resource activities shall be conducted in such a manner so that others can safely access the same resources. Any activity that might deplete a resource shall be subject to additional consultation.

7. The States Parties agree to share scientific data and information on the nature, conduct, locations, and results of space resource activities, including the discovery of new resources. Any concerns regarding private intellectual property shall be addressed using applicable national laws.

8. The Agency shall coordinate the development of standards and recommended practices. Priority will be given to equitable access to technology. No standard or practice shall be adopted that requires technology that is subject to export controls or is otherwise unavailable.

9. There shall be no fees for local utilization of outer space resources. Fees for the marketing of such resources, if any, shall be determined by the States Parties. Any fees collected shall be used to support equitable participation in outer space activities, including capacity building.

10. The States Parties shall review this Agreement in 10 years.

We have reached a pivotal moment in humanity’s history: our departure from the home planet. The decisions made now will affect humanity for decades, perhaps centuries. The closest parallel occurred five centuries ago, when the Age of Exploration became the Age of Imperialism, with its legacy of war, violence, and neglect that still affect us today. We can avoid repeating that pattern, but we must choose to cooperate in the utilization of resources from new worlds. Future generations are counting on us; let us not disappoint them.

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Dennis O’Brien is a space lawyer and former member of the NASA-UC Law Research Project in San Francisco. In 2017 he started The Space Treaty Project, a scientific and educational nonprofit based in northern California. Since then, he has produced over 35 papers, presentations, and articles on space law and policy. His most recent presentation, at Space Resources Week 2024 in Luxembourg, focused on the sustainable use of space resources and concerns that humanity is about to repeat the mistakes of the Age of Imperialism.

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The U.S.S. Hornet-A Pictorial History

Review: USS Hornet Chronological Pictorial History

by Dwayne A. Day
Monday, June 3, 2024

USS Hornet Chronological Pictorial History: Volume III and Volume IV
CVA-12 – CVS-12
Keeping the Peace 1953 – 1970
A William Ballenger Collection
Presented by The USS Hornet Sea, Air & Space Museum
Dennis de Freitas

Recovering astronauts in the middle of the ocean during the 1960s was a complicated, resource-intensive, and expensive operation. The US Navy provided substantial support for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo missions, usually an aircraft carrier and other naval vessels. Today, several of the carriers used in these operations—Hornet, Intrepid, and Yorktown—are museum ships, and feature displays about their role in the space program. There are books about the recovery efforts, notably Moon Men Return by Scott Carmichael, and Hornet Plus Three by Bob Fish.

One surprise in the book is a collection of Apollo 11 recovery photos taken in 1969 that have not been widely published or have been otherwise forgotten.

USS Hornet Chronological Pictorial History, published in 2021, also contains some information on this subject. The Hornet (CV-12), was built during World War II after her predecessor (CV-8), which launched the famous Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in 1942, was lost in October 1942, after barely a year in service. The second Hornet carrier finished out the war with distinction and continued to serve the Navy until 1970.

This book is the second in a series (the first is somewhat confusingly labeled Volume I and Volume II). It is a collection of black and white photographs of the USS Hornet in operation between 1953 and 1970, and a few photos after the ship’s decommissioning. The book is apparently a print-on-demand publication sponsored by the Hornet museum, and the overall quality of the photo reproductions is not high. Nevertheless, the photos are unique, and hard to find. They show the ship in various settings and configurations during this period.

The book contains approximately one dozen photos of Hornet’s service during the Apollo 11 and 12 recoveries, many not previously published.

The book includes photos of air operations and crew activities, including celebrations and liberty call. The photos are accompanied by a small map showing the area of the world where the ship was operating when the photo was taken, and most photos include citation information such as a National Archives accession number. Hornet was labeled an “attack carrier” for much of this time before being converted to support anti-submarine warfare (hence the change in her designation from “CVA” to “CVS”). At the beginning of the period covered in the book, Hornet quickly crossed the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal, and then spent the rest of her career operating in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Less than a year before Hornet’s retirement, the ship was assigned as primary recovery ship for the Apollo 11 and 12 missions. The Hornet is currently moored at the old Alameda Naval Air Station.

The book contains approximately one dozen photos of Hornet’s service during the Apollo 11 and 12 recoveries, many not previously published.

One surprise in the book is a collection of Apollo 11 recovery photos taken in 1969 that have not been widely published or have been otherwise forgotten. Most histories of Apollo have used only a few photos from only a few missions, and often the same photos have been reproduced in many different books. That does not mean that there are no other photos from the events during those missions, only that they have not been widely distributed. The photos include the recovery of the astronauts and their spacecraft, the astronauts’ arrival on the ship (where they wore protective suits in case they were contaminated with any “Moon germs”), the temporary astronaut living quarters in a converted Airstream trailer, and the ship’s return to Pearl Harbor. A few years ago, an Apollo 11 documentary ended with restored film footage showing Hornet arriving at Pearl, and the astronaut living quarters being removed from the ship. Although that event was covered in the news at the time, most histories barely mention it, so film and photos of the event serve as a reminder that Apollo recovery was a major logistical operation.

The book contains approximately one dozen photos of Hornet’s service during the Apollo 11 and 12 recoveries, many not previously published.

The book also has photos of the Apollo 12 recovery later in 1969. If Apollo 12 became a footnote in history, then the recovery effort has been treated by historians as a footnote to a footnote, but the book is a reminder that there was a substantial effort to recover that crew as well. Hornet was retired in June 1970 and then spent two decades in mothballs before being cleaned up and turned into a museum ship. I have visited the ship numerous times, along with several other aircraft carrier museums. Hornet looks the worse for wear and suffers from being located in an area that is not as centrally located as some other museum ships. As this collection of photographs demonstrates, the ship had a long and illustrious history.

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Dwayne Day has long been fascinated by aircraft carriers and is one of those people who considers it a tragedy that the USS Enterprise was scrapped after World War II. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.